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Mozi’s concept of xian is highly original, when compared to Confucius’ concept of xian, and 
that it rests upon “the recommendation of acquisition as a virtue.” Furthermore, the core of 
Confucius’ xian is the virtue of benevolence, where one prefers to yield to others rather than 
to have more than others. Confucius condemns acquisition as a vice; one term of his basic 
pair of moral terms is xiaoren who prefers acquisition to benevolence. In the light of these 
considerations, it is then obvious that Mozi’s xian is Confucius’ xiaoren in the sense of being 
the same man, except both thinkers evalute him differently. Mozi’s shang xian thus 
accomplishes an absolute reversal of Confucian moral values.  
 
This work is divided into three main parts. The first part identifies Mozi’s audience 
as rulers who desire three goals of a wealthy polity, demographic growth, and judicial and 
political order. If they were to adopt shang xian as a policy, they would do so in order to 
achieve these goals. More importantly, some of these rulers desire universal rule as an ultimate 
political goal, where the above three goals form its necessary conditions. The second part 
tries to show that shang xian is a necessary condition for universal rule through Mozi’s 
analysis of dynastic politics, where rulers lose their inherited universal empires due to their 
neglect of shang xian. The aim of the first two chapters is largely negative viz. to show that 
past studies of Mozi’s shang xian  as a means of achieving moral objectives is mistaken. 
Mozi’s audience may finally practice shang xian for a variety of reasons, but the predominant 
reason is political rather than moral. The last chapter begins with a short exposition of 
Mozi’s concept of xian and ends with the exploration of his motivation for articulating this 
original idea. The main of the chapter, however, focus on the relationship between Mozi’s 
and Confucius’ concepts of xian in order to warn us against being unduly influenced by 








A Note on the Text  
 
In this work, all references to Mozi, the text, begin with the citiation of the Havard-Yenching 
edition, followed by Mei Yi Bao’s translation of the revelant passages. The former is prefixed 
by ‘MZ’ and followed by the chapter, then line number; the latter, on the other hand, is 
prefixed by ‘Mei’ and followed by the chapter, then page numbers. An example of a citiation 
is “MZ 8/1-2; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (I), p60” where it refers to chapter 8, lines 1 to 2 
in the Havard-Yenching edition, and the same passage on page 60 of Mei’s translation. 
Throughout this work, the Chinese characters are romanized in the hanyu pinyin form; they 





The objective of this work is to show that Mozi’s shang xian contains a highly original 
political morality which rests upon “the recommendation of acquisition as a virtue.” If 
acquisition is regarded as a virtue rather than condemned as a vice, then one who prefers to 
have more over less can be regarded as a moral person. Morality as traditionally understood 
ceases to act as a restraint on acquisition, where one prefers to have less rather than more for 
moral reasons, since it is now always moral to prefer acquisition. Confucius’ philosophy 
represents an attempt to articulate this traditional understanding of morality, where 
acquisition is always somewhat opposed to morality. Both thinkers’ xian are men who 
embody their different thinking about the place of acquisition in human life viz. whether it is 
a moral virtue or vice. Mozi’s xian is a man who devotes himself to acquiring useful abilities, 
from the viewpoint of a ruler, in order to gain wealth and honour for himself; he is only 
interested in self-gain. From the viewpoint of Confucius, such a man is morally contemptible 
and marked as such by the name xiaoren. The same type of man is thus, from two different 
moral viewpoints, evaluated at the same time as moral and immoral. These considerations 
lead us to conclude that Mozi’s project in shang xian is not merely a teaching of meritocracy, 
where men with merit should be employed over men of high birth in government, but the 
creation of a new political morality which reverses Confucius’ moral judgement.  
 
 The core of Mozi’s shang xian is the idea of shang xian as the root of politics. There 
are two distinct senses in which this phrase may be understood, depending on how the key 
word ‘root’ is interpreted. In the first sense, shang xian is the root of politics because it is 
essential to politics viz. it is a necessary and sufficient condition for attaining the three goals 
of a wealthy polity, demographic growth, and judicial and political order. More importantly, 
it is also a necessary condition for acquiring and preserving a universal empire. In the second 
sense, shang xian is the root of politics because it is from this policy that a new form of 
politics emerges, where men are assumed to be acquisitive and it is a virtue to be a better 
acquisitor than others. The last point implies that Confucius’ and Mozi’s moral and political 
philosophies, on the assumption that xian form the ruling class, founds two different kinds 
of regimes which take acquisition to be the lowest and highest moral value respectively.  
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 The decisive difference between Confucius and Mozi about the concept of xian rests 
on a fundamental agreement that almost all men are by nature acquisitive viz. they desire 
wealth and honour over other things, and the only way for a few of them to prefer 
benevolence over acquisition is a Confucian education of their desires. Confucius’ best 
student Yan Hui is an example of one of the few men who nearly succeeded in embodying 
benevolence before his education was cut short by his early death. The existence of morality 
in the world, according to Confucius, requires the education of men’s desires toward 
benevolence; moral men are distinguished from other men by their moral intentions, and 
their strict adherence to those intentions. Without an education expressed as a form of self-
cultivation, morality simply is impossible because men would be unwillingly to give up their 
desire for wealth and honour for benevolence.  
 
 Mozi, on the other hand, adopts a different approach to the problem of morality that 
is directly opposed to Confucius’ solution. He rejects the idea of moral intentions in favour 
of moral effects produced by men who remain fundamentally acquisitive. Morality thus no 
longer requires self-cultivation, or an moral education of the Confucian form. Mozi designs a 
moral system where the amoral acquisitive desires of its members are channelled into moral 
effects such as the alleviation of universal hunger, the shelter of the weak from injustices etc. 
Mozi’s morality is an effect of a man-made system and no longer an act of any individual. 
Since the system cannot intend morality and its members do not intend morality, there is no 
need for existence of self-cultivation of individuals into moral beings for the existence of 
morality. Mozi’s shang xian is the attempt to create this system by introducing a new concept 
of xian through the practice of shang xian. Once a ruler adopts shang xian as a policy in his 
polity, he already accepts a relationship between a xian and himself that is based on mutual 
advantage viz. the ruler uses the xian for his own political purposes while the xian uses the 
rulers as the only path to wealth and honour. Even a xian’s loyalty to his ruler is no longer an 
expression of his manner of being or who he is, as Confucius would understand it, but 
conditional upon the ruler’s continual rewards.  
 
 This work is divided into three main parts where the first two parts are devoted to 
explaining shang xian as the root of politics in the first sense viz. it is essential to politics. The 
first part identifies Mozi’s audience as rulers who desire the three political goals of a wealthy 
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polity, demographic growth, and judicial and political order. A careful examination of the 
openings of Mozi’s triad of shang xian texts reveal that the rulers do want those goals rather 
than the interpretation that they should want them. This small observation is not trivial 
because the correct formulation of Mozi’s argument for shang xian depends on it. Nivison’s 
interpretation of Mozi’s shang xian commits this mistake of taking those goals as what the 
rulers should want. His investigations of how the goals of a wealthy polity, demographic 
growth, and judicial and political order contribute to the formation of a moral community 
result in his formulation of Mozi’s argument for shang xian as a moral one. If the rulers, 
however, do not take a moral community as their ultimate goal, then they should also desire 
those three goals for moral reasons in order to be convinced by Mozi’s argument for shang 
xian. Furthermore, Nivison’s interpretation is shaped by his view of politics as pragmatic 
action for moral purposes.  
 
 My critique of Nivison aims to show that Nivison’s reading of the goals as moral 
ones does not conform to Mozi’s texts, and his view of politics is not shared by Mozi’s 
audience, the rulers through an analysis of the second goal of demographic growth. The 
main criticism of Nivison’s strictly economic interpretation of demographic growth is its 
unhistoricity. The rulers may desire demographic growth for both economic and military 
purposes, and some of them may even be driven by imperial ambitions of conquest to pursue 
a deliberate policy of demographic growth. This interpretation seems to generate an 
inconsistency with Mozi’s polemic against conquest in his fei gong, but that inconsistency is 
only apparent. That some of the rulers desire conquest as the path toward universal rule does 
not entail that Mozi endorses this course of action. On the other hand, it also does not imply 
that Mozi cannot rely on these antecedent desires to persuade the rulers to adopt shang xian 
as a policy. A stronger form of this inconsistency involves the idea of shang xian as a 
necessary condition for the founding of dynasties through military action, and Mozi’s 
endorsement of shang xian would therefore entail an endorsement of conquest. The way to 
avoid this inconsistency is to rely on Mozi’s distinction between gong and zhu in his fei gong, 
where the founding of dynasties is excluded from the category of gong or conquest. The 
founding of dynasties belong to the category of zhu, and thus Mozi’s endorsement of shang 
xian does not entail an endorsement of conquest. The first part ends with the union of 
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political knowledge and political power as the conditions for the existence of shang xian as a 
practice in the world.  
 
 The second part shows that shang xian is a necessary condition for the acquisition and 
preservation of universal empires through an analysis of Mozi’s understanding of dynastic 
politics, especially the founding of dynasties. Since Mozi’s audience are hereditary rulers and 
can only acquire universal empires through the founding of dynasties, their models of 
political success would be founders of dynasties like Tang, Wen and Wu. Mozi’s basic insight 
into dynastic politics is that the distinction between ancient sheng wang (sage-kings) and bao 
wang (tyrants) is a political, not a moral one. Graham, on the other hand, interprets this 
distinction as a moral one because he assumes Mozi merely accepted the traditional 
understanding of sheng wang as models of moral perfection. Graham was unable to explain 
why Mozi chose those few men as sheng wang and bao wang out of the whole set of ancient 
rulers on the basis of his approach.  
 
Mozi’s deliberate choice of those few men is explained by the observations that 
dynasties are created by founders who invariably belong to the class of sheng wang and they 
are ended by their descendants who invariably are known to posterity as bao wang. The 
inquiry into these two observations lead us to the conclusion that shang xian is a necessary 
condition for the founding and preservation of dynasties for two reasons. Firstly, shang xian 
was never a policy of any bao wang while the founders of dynasties invariably practiced shang 
xian. Secondly, the many rulers who lived between the founder and the destroyer of their 
dynasty did not destroy their dynasty because they followed their founder in the practice of 
shang xian.  
 
The third part basically analyzes Mozi’s concept of xian from his description of shang 
xian as a practice, and then contrasts it with Confucius’ notions of xian and benevolence in 
order to show that Mozi’s concept of xian is truly original. More importantly, Mozi’s concept 
of xian is directly opposed to that of Confucius, and in the last section of this part, there is 
an attempt to outline Mozi’s reasons for articulating a new political morality through his 
highly original concept of xian.  









The objective of this chapter is to show that some rulers do in fact desire universal rule, 
although all rulers may adopt shang xian as a policy for a variety of reasons. The received 
interpretation of Mozi’s shang xian, most clearly seen in the work of Nivison, holds Mozi to 
be making the explicit argument for indvidual ability rather than birth, as the key criterion 
for political office. The belief in a necessary connection between being born into a particular 
social class and political performance was exposed to be false and thus unjust. For Nivison, 
this represents Mozi’s philosophic achievement. However, Mozi truly intends to justify shang 
xian as a practice on the basis of its usefulness to rulers rather than its justice. Any cursory 
reading of the openings of Mozi’s shang xian would reveal Mozi’s description of the 
frustrated desires of all rulers with respect to three goals which include a wealthy polity (國
家之富), demographic growth (人民之眾), and judicial and political order (刑政之治). He 
then offers shang xian as the solution to these immediate political problems. Any ruler would 
accept shang xian, if he was truly persuaded of its usefulness, on the basis of what he does 
want and not what he should want viz those three goals. Nivison, on the other hand, has read 
these goals as what rulers should want under the rubric of ‘basic goods’ within the framework 
of Mozi’s normative ethics. With respect to Mozi’s shang xian, he committed a textual error 
of fact here.  
 
Nivison further defined ‘a good government’ as one which attains those ‘basic 
goods.’ This definition drawn from Nivison’s reading of Mozi’s shang xian rests on an silent 
assumption that the true measure of politics are moral standards, and thus theorising about 
politics should be subordinated to theorising about morality. This assumption shapes 
Nivison’s entire reading of Mozi’s philosophy, without ever being part of it, and leads him to 
misunderstand the significance of the rulers’ second goal, demographic growth. This is his 
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second error, but one of interpretation. The goal of demographic growth, on Nivison’s 
analysis, is purely economic and the necessary means to the more important aim of wealth 
creation, without which a moral community would not be possible. He did not consider the 
possibility that a growing population also provides soldiers for war, in addition to supplying 
more labourers. However, there is no clear evidence that Mozi also shared Nivison’s 
assumption; my overall interpretation later challenges this assumption in the second chapter.  
 
My criticisms of Nivison aims at exposing the poverty of Nivison’s account; he had 
mistakenly treated Mozi’s shang xian as a piece of academic philosophising, somewhat in the 
Anglo-amercian style of analysis. The Anglo-american style of analysis is more often than 
not very dismissive of the value of historical analysis in its contribution to philosophical 
understanding; it often treats texts of philosophical value as a set of arguments, rather than 
situate them in their historical context. This chapter attempts to identify the audience of 
Mozi’s shang xian, and think through their possible motivations for shang xian, thereby 
reinstating some value of historical analysis in regard to the philosophical understanding of 
Mozi’s shang xian. The novelty of my approach then lies in its treatment of Mozi’s shang xian 
as political-philosophic work, where my idea of a philosophical work does not prima facie 
exclude historical analysis. It is a political work in two ways. Firstly, it offers a solution to the 
immediate problems of a specific political audience. Secondly, it constructs a new political 
morality through the introduction of a new definition of xian. The latter will be discussed in 
the third chapter, whereas the recognition of the former leads us to identify and characterize 
that audience.  
 
On the basis of Mozi’s texts, it can be inferred that Mozi’s intended audience 
consists of all rulers who failed to attain the stated goals. Their frustration derives from their 
ignorance of shang xian as the root of politics. New developments in warfare had made it 
necessary to field a very large army, and thus created a demand for demographic growth as a 
steady supply of soldiers. The need to field a large army by itself does not entail any desire to 
conquer the world in order to rule over an empire; a ruler could either defend himself against 
his political enemies or attack others with a large army. Mozi’s audience may be motivated by 
a variety of reasons to adopt the policy of shang xian in the end. However, it can be shown 
that some rulers in fact desire to rule an empire, and thus need a large army to accomplish that 
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goal through conquest. The existence of these rulers would be sufficient to compel other 
rulers to maintain and field large armies of their own. The desire for a large army is sufficient 
as a motivation, one among many, to persuade most rulers to adopt shang xian as a policy in 
this particular historical context. Mozi’s goal of persuading all rulers to practice shang xian is 
not impaired by the fact that universal rule can only be attained by a single individual or 
family because his rhetorical strategy trades on the rulers’ competition for universal rule, and 
not the fact of being the universal ruler itself. Many human beings, for example, still 
compete in agonistic contests like athletic events, although only one of them may emerge the 
victor in the end, and they undergo arduous training precisely because there can only be one 
winner. In this sense, the idea of all rulers practicing shang xian will not conflict with the 
assumption that all rulers desire universal rule, an assumption that i do not hold in this essay.  
 
The sole source of political power in a world of hereditary politics is inheritance. As 
a result, Mozi lacks the requisite power to practice shang xian, despite his knowledge of shang 
xian as the root of politics. On the other hand, rulers who inherited their political power are 
ignorant of this political knowledge. It is the combination of these two factors which makes 
the actual practice of shang xian possible; without knowledge of shang xian, the power of the 
rulers to appoint xian would be ineffectual, and they would remain in their original condition 




Mozi’s beginnings: the character of his audience 
 
Mozi’s shang xian exists as a triad of texts, and they shall be referred to as shang xian A, 
B and C respectively as a matter of convenience. In this section we shall be concerned about 
the correct reading of the openings of this textual triad. Many previous studies of Mozi’s 
philosophy have used these beginnings as textual sources for their interpretations, but they 
overlooked the importance of studying these passages on their own terms. Nivison’s 
influential work is typical of this approach. The correction of this interpretive neglect 
requires us to read those passages again in their original context. The translated beginnings 
of Mozi’s shang xian are provided below to help us in this task.  
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shang xian A 




Motse said: Now, all the rulers desire their provinces to be wealthy, their 
people to be numerous, and their jurisdiction to secure order. But what they 
obtain is not wealth but poverty, not multitude but scarcity, not order but 
chaos – this is to lose what they desire and obtain what they avert. Why is 
this?1   
 




Motse said: Now, in caring for the people, ruling the state, and governing the 
country, the rulers desire permanency and stability. But why do they not learn 
that exaltation of the virtuous is the foundation of government?2  
 





Motse said: All the rulers in the world desire their states to be wealthy, their 
people to be many, and their government and jurisdiction to be orderly. But 
                                                     
1 MZ 8/1-2; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (I), p60. 
2 MZ 9/1-2; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p72. 
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they do not understand to govern their states and people by exaltation of the 
virtuous.3    
 
This triad of the openings of Mozi’s shang xian have several interesting common features. 
Firstly, Mozi states right at the start what all rulers, who presumably are his contemporaries, 
desire and yet fail to achieve. They all desire a wealthy polity (國家之富)4, demographic 
growth (人民之眾), and judicial and political order (刑政之治). Secondly, the rulers have 
achieved political outcomes contrary to their desires. Mozi traced the cause of the rulers’ 
frustrated desires to their ignorance of shang xian as the root of politics. The political 
situation of the rulers poses a problem of knowledge for them; they had remained unaware 
of their own ignorance, until Mozi confronts them with the possibility of shang xian. Thirdly, 
it is evident that Mozi’s shang xian views things from the perspective of rulers. He both 
speaks about and to the rulers in this triad of beginnings. Since only rulers have the political 
power to appoint xian to their government, Mozi must speak to the rulers in order to 
persuade them to implement shang xian as a policy.  
 
 When the beginnings of Mozi’s shang xian are compared with each other, we find the 
openings of shang xian A and C to be identical with respect to the rulers’ three desires of a 
wealthy polity, demographic growth, and judicial and political order, and the order of those 
desires.5 These descriptions are absent from shang xian B; Mozi speaks about the rulers’ 
single desire to preserve what they already possess (欲脩保而勿失) in shang xian B. This 
difference seems to juxtapose two different attitudes of the rulers, on the assumption that 
Mozi’s audience are identical for the triad of texts, toward what they already have. In shang 
                                                     
3 MZ 10/1-2; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (III), p96.  
4 The grammatical rules of Classical Chinese make it possible to interpret the first desire of the rulers 
國家之富 either as the desire to increase the personal wealth of the family of the ruler, or the desire 
to increase the wealth of the 國家 where  國家之富 refers to the general wealth of the city, state, or 
country. The first interpretation understands the ruler to be entirely self-interested while the second 
thinks of him as being more public-spirited. As we shall see in the subsequent discussion of this 
chapter, this ambiguity is essential to the political-philosophical project of Mozi.  
5 See also Lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint For a Chinese Utopia, p76-77. Lowe merely observes that 
“Chapters 1 and 3 have very similar openings; though worded differently” and “the beginning of 
“Exaltation of the Virtuous 2” [Lowe’s translation of Shang Xian B] nicely complements the concerns 
expressed in “Exaltation of the Virtuous 1” and “Exaltation of the Virtuous 3.” He did not note the 
specific difference between Shang Xian A and C, and B.  
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xian A and C, the rulers are disappointed in their hope of increasing their original possessions. 
In shang xian B, on the other hand, they fear the loss of their original possessions. These two 
contrary affects of hope and fear suggest that Mozi’s audience may all desire a wealthy politiy, 
demographic growth, and judicial and political order, but for different reasons. Since the 
universal quantifier ‘all’ (皆) is missing from the opening of shang xian B, it is reasonable to 
suppose Mozi’s description there only applies to some rulers, not all. In addition, when we 
read through the whole of shang xian B, we discover that Mozi attributes two other desires, 
absent from both shang xian A and C, to the rulers. They are the desire to be the absolute 
ruler of the whole world (王天下) and the desire to rectify, or put into place, the other rulers 
of polities (正諸侯).6 These two desires are not unconnected. Since only the ruler of a 
universal empire (天下) has the power and authority to put other rulers of polities (諸侯) 
into their place, we can think of these two desires as one – the desire to be a ruler of a 
universal empire – for the sake of simplicity. These considerations lead us to conclude that it 
is better, as a matter of consistency and simplicity, to think of the rulers’ fundamental 
attitude as acquisitive, rather than conservative. 7  Overall, the textual sources for my 
interpretation of Mozi’s shang xian will be shang xian A and C.  
 
The overall interpretation of Mozi’s shang xian in this work requires us to pose the 
question of whether Mozi’s statements in the triad of beginnings are descriptive or 
prescriptive. The first answer involves thinking of the rulers’ three desires of a wealth polity, 
demographic growth, and judicial and political order as antecedent to Mozi’s teaching of 
shang xian; the latter does not shape the former in any significant way. In contrast, the second 
answer implies that the rulers ought to possess those goals, and they only pursued them, only 
after learning of Mozi’s shang xian. In the next section of this chapter we shall see that 
Nivison’s account of Mozi’s shang xian chose the second alternative. This question is 
important because how Mozi’s argument for shang xian is understood crucially depends on 
how it is answered.  
                                                     
6 MZ 9/70-1; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p94.  
7 Mozi deliberately disregards the most important political difference between polities – their power 
relative to each other. During Mozi’s time, the power of any particular polity is directly correlated 
with its territorial size. Hence, when addressing his political audience, Mozi ‘forgets’ that polities 
differ in terms of size. From his other writings, we know that Mozi is aware of the difference 
between big polities and small polities, but this difference seems to be irrelevant here.  
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We shall indicate some evidence for the first answer by the way of characterizing 
Mozi’s audience from the openings of the triad of texts. They are identified by three titles 
(王公大人) which seems to be placed on an equal footing with each other on the basis of 
their common political activity (為政於國家). None of them are referred by their proper 
names, thus identifying them as unique individuals, rather they are members of a single class. 
Shorn of personal and moral qualities, Mozi’s audience are defined by how they are 
addressed by others, the fact that they are engaged in politics, and a description of their 
frustrated desires. In addition, the verb ‘欲’ (desire) found in the triad of beginnings suggests 
the rulers’ actual desires, and its modification by the universal quantifier ‘皆’ (all) in shang 
xian A and C further supports the idea that all rulers do want those goals. These textual 
considerations, of course, do not give us conclusive reasons to decide against Nivison’s 
decision. Nonetheless, the ideas of Mozi’s audience as a class with the common problem of 
ignorance, and revelation of the rulers’ desire for universal rule in shang xian B give strong 
support for the position of reading Mozi’s statements as descriptions of, rather than 
prescriptions to the rulers.  
 
 
Nivison’s account of Mozi’s shang xian 
 
Nivison’s most recent work on Chinese thought is an intellectual history of currents 
and conflicts before the political unification of China through military conquest by the state 
of Qin.8 Out of a total of sixty-eight pages, he devotes seven to a concise outline of Mozi’s 
philosophy in three main parts.9 The first part introduces Mozi the man, his time and the 
book that bears his name. The second deals with Mozi’s moral values, and the last with 
Mozi’s controversial idea of ‘impartial caring,’ Nivison’s translation of ‘jian ai’. In the second 
paragraph of the first part, Nivison alludes to Mozi’s shang xian by saying that Mozi argues 
more explicitly than Confucius that “lordly employers should give officies to men who are 
                                                     
8 David Shepherd Nivison, “The Classical Philosophical Writings,” The Cambridge History of Ancient 
China. Edited by Edward L. Shaughnessy, Michael Loewe. New York: Cambridge UP, 1998, p745– 
812. Hereforth, “The Classical Philosophical Writings” will be abbreviated as CPW for convenience.  
9 Nivison, CPW, p759-65.  
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worthy, rather than to men who have the right aristocratic connections.” 10  Other than 
identifying the main conclusion as a prescription of policy to rulers, nothing further is said 
about Mozi’s shang xian. Furthermore, Mozi’s argument does not seem particularly 
exceptional because it was already implied by Confucius’ teachings in the Analects. However, 
Mozi’s shang xian forms a key textual basis of Nivison’s interpretation of Mozi’s moral and 
political philosophy.11 The adequacy of Nivison’s reading therefore crucially depends on 
whether his understanding of Mozi’s shang xian is fundamentally correct.  
 
 From Mozi’s shang xian, Nivison derives the three “basic goods” of Mozi’s moral 
consequentialism12 : “order (absence of conflict between persons, families, cities, states), 
material wealth for the community and increase in population.”13 Those goods are basic in 
two main senses. Firstly, they are social goods and resist further analysis into simpler goods 
for individuals.14  Secondly, they form the rational foundation of Mozi’s moral philosophy; 
they are the non-moral preconditions for the achievement of Mozi’s ultimate moral goal, the 
existence of a moral community. However, Nivison does not adhere closely to the text; he 
shifted ‘order’ from its third position in the text to its primary standing here. This is 
probably explained by Nivison’s belief in ‘impartial caring’ as the core of Mozi’s philosophy, 
and his interpretation of this idea as “the solution to all socially destructive conflict, from 
quarrels between individuals to war between states.”15 Nivison’s arrangement of those basic 
goods then represents his view of what Mozi values morally, and in that order. His 
abstraction of these elements from their context in Mozi’s shang xian seems further justified 
by their presence in Mozi’s fei ming A.16  
 
                                                     
10 Nivison, CPW, p760.  
11 Nivison, CPW, p761. See especially notes 26 and 28, where it is evident that Mozi’s shang xian A 
and fei ming A are the main textual sources for Nivison’s exposition.  
12 Nivison, CPW, p761. Nivison characterizes Mozi’s mode of thinking as consequentialist in nature.  
13 Nivison, CPW, p761.  
14 Nivison, CPW, p761. Nivison interprets the “basic goods” of Mozi’s moral philosophy as “goods 
for social entities: there is no appeal to happiness or pleasure for individuals in Mozi’s 
‘utilitarianism.”  
15 Nivison, CPW, p763.  
16 Only a single character marks the difference between the openings of Mozi’s shang xian A and fei 
ming A. However, the usual amendments of the character ‘古’ in fei ming A to ‘今’ renders both 
identical.  
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 Nivison does not conceive of those goods as separate, independent elements, but as 
an ensemble of conditions for the achievement of a moral community. They are interrelated 
in the following manner: “more basic wealth, then more reproduction; more people, then 
more production and wealth. Conflict will interfere with both, whereas if people have plenty, 
they will be good, filial, kind, and so on unproblematically.”17 In effect, Nivison asserts a 
biconditional relation between wealth and demographics on his account where wealth is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for demographic growth, and the latter in turn is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the former. For Nivison, the building up of manpower 
resources through demographic growth does not seem to have any other motive or purpose 
than the creation of material wealth for the community. The absence of conflict is conducive 
for economic prosperity and demographic growth. Most importantly, moral relations among 
human beings are only possible between members of an economically prosperous 
commnuity. Those three ‘basic goods’ therefore are directly or indirectly instrumental to the 
achievement of a moral community. This is the meaning of Mozi’s moral consequentialism, 
where the ultimate consequence to be achieved is a moral community, and thus any good or 
act that contributes to this is moral in nature. There is nothing inherently moral about those 
“basic goods” insofar as they are pursued for other goals other than the achievement of a 
moral community. Mozi’s shang xian as an act of policy also derives its morality from its 
contribution to this overall goal. Hence, Mozi’s moral argument for shang xian, on Nivison’s 
account, is all rulers are obliged to shang xian in order to achieve a moral community on the 
basis of a strong economy.18  
 
 Nivison’s term “basic goods” which is crucial to his interpretation of Mozi’s moral 
consequentialism is textually absent from Mozi’s shang xian. Normative ethics, in the Anglo-
american style of analysis, often makes use of this term to designate the building blocks of a 
particular understanding of morality. This redescription of what textually appears as the 
                                                     
17 Nivison, CPW, p761.  
18 Nivison, CPW, p760-3. Nivison’s decision to place his account of Mozi’s shang xian under the name 
“Moral Values” further confirms my view that for Nivison, Mozi primarily is a moral philosopher. 
Nivison’s method of reading Mozi’s shang xian consists in first stating Mozi’s ultimate moral end, and 
subsequently reaches the conclusion that shang xian is a moral obligation imposed upon us by that 
end. From the perspective of Rawls’ philosophical terminology, Nivison’s interpretation proceeds on 
the level of ideal theory where the structure of a perfectly just society is constructed in theory, 
without regard for its practical realization.    
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desires of all rulers as “basic goods” is not a philosophically neutral act, rather it introduces 
an important ambiguity. It is not evident whether these “basic goods” are what all rulers do 
want, or what they should want.19 If any ruler is convinced of his moral obligation to shang 
xian, it must be presupposed that he holds the achievement of a moral community as an 
ultimate moral end. Since the “basic goods” are necessary and sufficient conditions for such 
an ultimate end, it follows that such a ruler also has a moral obligation to desire these “basic 
goods,” if he did not already possess this requisite desire. He therefore would be obliged to 
have this desire in order to fulfil his moral obligation to shang xian; this difficulty could be 
avoided if he does have this desire in the first place, independent of any moral obligation to 
shang xian. However, there is no conclusive evidence that both Mozi and the rulers do want 
those “basic goods” for identical reasons, although it is textually true that the rulers do want a 
wealthy polity, demographic growth, and judicial and political order.20  
 
 Nivison’s untextual choice of reading the “basic goods” as what the rulers should 
want rests on his conception of politics as pragmatic action for moral purposes. He had 
conceived of Mozi’s project as an attempt to moralize politics where the rulers’ original 
political goals, whatever they may be, are replaced by Mozi’s ultimate end of a moral 
community. Nivison’s conception assumes that Mozi indeed shares his view of politics, and 
imposes such a view on the rulers. In his exposition of Mozi’s philosophy, Nivison has 
defined Mozi’s understanding of a good government as “one that realizes nameable material 
benefits for the community” where the “nameable material benefits” are what he calls “basic 
goods.” 21  Clearly, he attributes his own understanding of politics to Mozi, since this 
definition of a good government occurs nowhere in Mozi’s texts. Nonetheless, without ever 
                                                     
19 Scott Lowe’s Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint For A Chinese Utopia, the only book in the English language 
devoted to a study of Mozi’s philosophy, interprets Mozi’s description of what all rulers desire as 
“the natural, shared aims of all civilized leaders.” Lowe introduced a distinction between civilized and 
uncivilized leaders into the class of all rulers (王公大人), where none exists in the first place; he 
assumes that “it is understood by the early Mohists that their goals are shared, at least in part, by 
nearly all readers of the text and therefore do not require proof.” Lowe further supports his view that 
all rulers do want the three goals of a wealthy polity, demographic growth, and judicial and political 
order with the statement “rare is the ruler who does not at least claim to desire greater prosperity and 
security for his people.” Lowe’s basic view is textually accurate, but his assumption that Mozi and the 
rulers do want these goals for identical reasons is mistaken.  
20 See MZ 8/1-2; MZ 9/1-2; and MZ 10/1-2.  
21  Nivison, CPW, p761. See note 16. The textual sources for Nivison’s definition of a good 
goverment are Mozi’s shang xian A, B and C.  
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being a part of his reading of Mozi’s shang xian, Nivison’s view of politics silently shapes his 
reading. The failure of Nivison’s account to identify and characterize Mozi’s audience, 
especially their own view of politics, can also be explained by this silent presupposition. In 
the next section, my criticisms of Nivison’s account will reveal that some rulers do not share 
his view of politics, and Mozi is making a political argument, not a moral one as it has been 
long thought, to the rulers for shang xian. There is no a priori reason why Mozi’s shang xian 
cannot be justified on the ground political necessity, as opposed to moral obligation, and it is 
indeed justified on such a ground.  
 
 
Critique of Nivison’s interpretation 
 
 My critique of Nivison’s account of Mozi’s shang xian aims at exposing the poverty of 
his account, and arguing for the conclusion that some rulers are driven by imperial ambitions 
to pursue the goals of a wealthy polity, demographic growth, and judicial and political order. 
Nivison’s view of politics as pragmatic action for moral purposes has hindered an inquiry 
into the motives of Mozi’s intended audience, and obscured the fact that the rulers may 
pursue the above goals for a variety of motives, not necessarily identical with Mozi’s purpose. 
His account of Mozi’s shang xian has concentrated on answering the question of Mozi’s 
ultimate purpose for desiring those goals; the question of the rulers’ motives was never 
posed because Mozi’s argument for shang xian, on Nivison’s account, never relied on those 
motives. This question is primarily important because only a proper characterization of the 
rulers, Mozi’s intended audience, can allow us to correctly identify Mozi’s argument for shang 
xian. Later in this section, my analysis of the possible motives underlying the rulers’ desire 
for demographic growth will reveal that Mozi’s argument for shang xian actually rests upon 
political necessity, rather than moral obligation.  
 
 Nivison had used Mozi’s shang xian A and fei ming A as his main textual sources for 
his exposition of Mozi’s moral values and definition of a good government.22 His use of 
these sources manifestly contradicts Mozi’s original intention of applying shang xian and fei 
                                                     
22 Nivison, CPW, p761.  
 16
ming to different problems.23 He also overlooks the obvious fact that Mozi’s shang xian was 
like a remedy for the frustrated desires of rulers with common goals, while Mozi’s fei ming 
was a philosophical polemic against the belief in the existence of ming, or fate. Mozi’s shang 
xian is not an academic treatise, somewhat in the Anglo-american style of analysis, that 
exposits Mozi’s moral and political philosophy; it is more like a practical treatise whose 
purpose is to solve a particular problem of a specific audience. Mozi’s shang xian therefore 
should be studied on its own terms, independent of the rest of Mozi’s teachings, because 
their philosophical and rhetorical contexts are different.  
 
 My approach differs from Nivison’s in trying to characterize how Mozi’s audience 
view politics in order to identify Mozi’s argument for shang xian. By comparing the openings 
of Mozi’s shang xian with Nivison’s account of Mozi’s shang xian, we establish the conclusion 
that all rulers do in fact desire the goals of a wealthy polity, demographic growth, and judicial 
and political order, whatever their motives. Nivison therefore commits a textual error of fact 
with his reading of “basic goods” as what all rulers should desire. His inaccuracy leads us to 
doubt his view of politics underlying his interpretation. We can further infer how Mozi’s 
audience actually view politics, distinct from Nivison’s normative view, from an adequate 
analysis of possible motives underlying the desire for demographic growth. While it may be 
difficult to measure or determine whether one has succeeded in achieving communal wealth, 
and judicial and political order, it is quite uncontroversial to say that if there are more men in 
a ruler’s polity as a result of his policies, either due to a rise in birth rates or a decline in 
death rates, he has achieved demographic growth. The more important and interesting 
question is why this ruler pursues such a goal in the first place. That analysis will reveal that 
Nivison’s explanation of the motive for demographic growth as purely economic contradicts 
the historical realities of new modes of warfare, emergence of the territorial state, and 
absence of a strict separation of roles between labourers and soldiers.24 Nivison therefore is 
too restrictive in his interpretation of the underlying motive(s) of demographic growth.  
 
                                                     
23  See Mei, Lü Wen, p502. In this conversation with his student Weiyue, Mozi divides his ten 
teachings into five pairs, each concerned with a specific problem confronting a polity. Mozi’s shang 
xian belongs to the first pair intended for solving the problem of political disorder, while fei ming is 
his solution for music and alcoholic decadence within a polity.  
24 David A. Graff, “The legacy of antiquity,” Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300-900, 17-34.  
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Motives for demographic growth 
 
 In the context of Mozi’s shang xian, an increase in population size, as opposed to a 
population decline, is a desirable form of demographic change. Apparently, one of the 
reasons for putting shang xian into practice, from a ruler’s point of view, would be obtaining 
demographic growth. However, the reasons for thinking demographic growth as desirable 
are not found in Mozi’s shang xian. That demographic growth in itself is an unintelligible goal 
is self-evident; no sane ruler would desire to multiply his problems of ruling, feeding and 
housing a rapidly growing population deliberately by pursuing a policy of demographic 
growth in itself. A Malthusian nightmare will confront such an imprudent ruler. Hence, the 
rulers must be pursuing a policy of demographic growth for some other motives. To 
understand these motives meaningfully, we must place this goal of demographic growth in 
its historical context.  
 
 For much of its history, China is populous and has a predominantly rural economy 
that is highly dependent on human labour, in the absence of mechanization, for the creation 
of material wealth. In this type of economy, a direct correspondence exists between 
population growth and rising economic prosperity. Nivison therefore rightly points out that 
an increase in population size is the necessary and sufficient condition for economic 
prosperity. He further infers that the only motive for demographic growth is purely 
economic. However, Nivison fails to consider the importance of historical context for an 
inquiry into possible motives for demographic growth. The modes of warfare in pre-Qin 
China changed in its transition from the Spring and Autumn period to the Warring States 
period. The most important shift is the rise of the large-scale infantry army that in turn 
introduced innovations such as “population registration, universal military service, and ranks 
of military merit.”25 The growth in the size of armies has its roots in the conceptual shift 
from a state organized for a balance-of-power kind of politics to one organized for total 
warfare.26  
 
                                                     
25 Mark Edward Lewis, “Warring States Political History,” The Cambridge History of Ancient China, 
p620-32.  
26 Lewis, Warring States Political History, p627-8.  
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 In that same period, the territorial state whose boundaries are defined by battle 
emerged as the new paradigm of a state.27 Two most significant consequences of this new 
understanding are total territorial loss implies that a state has ceased to exist, and conquest 
becomes a legitimate mode of acquirring territory. For any ruler to effectively assert his claim 
over any piece of territory, he must possess the ability to field a large enough army either to 
deter a potential aggressor, or resist an actual one. Similarly, he must be in a position to win 
wars if he wants to acquire the territory of others. The fundamental basis of territory rights 
therefore is military might. Lewis has observed “the polities of this period were “states 
organized for warfare.” and “population registration, universal military service, and ranks of 
miltiary merit were adapted to enable each state to expand at the expense of its 
neighbours.”28  This political development also contributed to the need for large armies 
which in turn drives the demand for demographic growth.  
 
 In a conversation between Mozi and the ruler of a small polity Lü Yang, Mozi 
compares the phenomenon of large states attacking small ones to little boys playing at horse 
riding.29 Mozi’s main point is to reveal the illusory nature of military glory; if wars resemble 
the play of small children, they cannot be serious. However, Mozi’s description of how wars 
compel men to abandon their real work as farmers or weavers to serve as soldiers either in 
offensive or defensive wars against other states is of more interest for the present argument. 
The same men are soldiers in war and labourers in peace. Professional soldiers distinct from 
peasant conscripts exist only as personal guards of important nobles and rulers. 30 
Furthermore, Lewis’s observation that “peasants from the rural hinterland were drawn into 
miltiary service” strengthens my argument that a strong motive for the pursuit of population 
growth is the need to field larger armies in this era.  
 
 Nivison might object to my conclusion for two reasons. Firstly, he might think the 
wrong conclusion was drawn from Mozi’s conversation. The correct one should be the 
outbreak of any war severely disrupts economic activities, thus affecting the quantity of 
                                                     
27 Zuozhuan, 41 (Zhao 1), 8a-10a (Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, p576-7). See also Lewis, Warring 
States Political History, p603-16.  
28 Lewis, Warring States Political History, p620.  
29 Mei, Keng Chu, p432-5.  
30 Lewis, Warring States Political History, p621.  
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created wealth. Secondly, he might indicate that if the same men are both soldiers and 
labourers, any population growth also enlarges the labour pool, and thus increase the 
quantity of created wealth. Nivison’s two points are valid observations. They can be 
condensed into the single point that any demographic growth implies both a larger army and 
more wealth. Howver, military campaigns cannot be sustained on the basis of a weak, or 
faltering economy. The key question is not whether demographic growth is desirable for 
either military expansion or wealth accumulation, but which motive is predominant, for a 
ruler could possibly desire more wealth in order to field a larger and better army. Perhaps, a 
constellation of motives underlie the desire for population growth, and different rulers 
pursue this demographic policy for a single, or a combination of several motives. But 
Nivison clearly misinterprets the intentions of Mozi’s audience, if he restricts the motive to a 
purely economic one, especially when this motive cannot be prescribed to the rulers, for 
textual reasons.  
 
Rulers’ view of politics  
 
 Mozi’s fei gong is a polemic against conquest, and addressed to those who believe 
conquest to be both just and profitable. In Mozi’s fei gong B, a ruler openly declares his love 
of conquest, or offensive wars. He wants to acquire for himself military glory, or the name 
of a victor, and properties of the vanquished through conquest; he believes conquest to be a 
profitable enterprise and a just mode of acquisition. This frank confession of a single ruler 
would not be interesting, if he was an exception who expressed his personal opinion, but the 
rhetoric context of Mozi’s fei gong implies that he is representative of the class of rulers. Insofar 
as wars are part of politics, and most rulers consider conquest to be both just and profitable, 
they would view politics as pragmatic action for purposes of self-aggrandizement. Our 
investigation of the beginnings of Mozi’s shang xian reveals a description of the frustrated 
desires of all rulers in Mozi’s own words. Since this description is expressed in the form of a 
universal statement, it is only true if all rulers truly do want the three goals of a wealthy polity, 
demographic growth, and judicial and political order. Nivison’s interpretation of those goals 
as what all rulers should want and his restriction of the motive for demographic growth to a 
purely economic one rest on his view of politics as pragmatic action for moral purposes. 
Other than the fact that any reading of the goals as what all rulers should want, rather than 
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what they do want, is untextual, it would manifestly render Mozi’s universal description false 
because if all rulers should want those gaols, then at least one ruler does not want them. 
Furthermore, Nivison’s view of politics which is not derived from a close study of Mozi’s 
shang xian, and has been shown to be contrary to the rulers’ own view.  
 
 On the basis of the rulers’ view of politics as pragmatic action for self-
aggrandizement, the next step is to show that some rulers are driven by imperial ambitions, 
and Mozi’s argument for shang xian rests upon political necessity, and not moral obligation. 
Mozi’s fei gong C contains some rulers’ objections against Mozi’s thesis that conquest is both 
unjust and unprofitable. 31  These objections are revealing of the rulers’ true opinions 
concerning conquest and politics. The rulers argue that conquest is just because ancient sage 
kings had practised it, while it is profitable because large states of their day had expanded at 
the expense of their neighbours. Their justification of a politics of war rests on the widely 
shared cultural assumption that ancient sage kings are models of justice. However, the fact 
that ancient sage kings were universal rulers, that is, rulers over empires is more significant. 
It suggests that the rulers who attempted to justify conquest against Mozi’s fei gong polemic 
has imperial ambitions. The historical transition from a balance-of-power politics to one of 
total warfare, following the move of the Zhou capital eastwards by King Ping32, allowed and 
encouraged the creation of a new empire through conquest to replace the Zhou dynasty. 
Mozi’s explicit statement of the rulers’ imperial ambitions in shang xian B, and the implied 
imperial ambitions of rulers in fei gong B are additional evidence which support the 
conclusion that some rulers are driven by imperial ambitions to desire a wealthy polity, 
demographic growth, and judicial and political order.  
 
An apparent inconsistency  
 
 If it is truly the case that some rulers are driven by imperial ambitions to pursue the 
goals of a wealthy polity, demographic growth, and judicial and political order, Mozi’s shang 
xian then is a teaching which seems to satisfy their desires. Mozi claims that shang xian 
obtains those goals, and all rulers do desire them; however, he did not claim that all rulers 
                                                     
31 Mei, Condemnation of Offensive War (III), p220-33.  
32 Cho-yun Hsu, “The Spring and Autumn Period,” The Cambridge History of Ancient China, p545-86.  
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desire those goals for moral purposes. Most of the rulers represented by the frank ruler in 
Mozi’s fei gong B love conquest as a just mode of acquisition, and view politics as pragmatic 
action for self-aggrandizement. If conquest is taken to its absolute limit where everything is 
owned by a single person or family, the result is a universal empire. A significant portion of 
Mozi’s audience can be said to be driven by imperial ambitions, and Mozi’s argument for 
shang xian therefore appeals to such desires in order to convince the rulers to put shang xian 
into practice.  
 
 Such a formulation of Mozi’s argument for shang xian seems to generate an 
inconsistency with other teachings of Mozi, especially fei gong. Mozi’s fei gong is a polemic 
against conquest,33 while this interpretation of Mozi’s shang xian presents shang xian as an 
effective means to the conquest of empire.34 The inconsistency therefore is that Mozi seems 
to be arguing for conquest in shang xian and against it in fei gong. On the assumption of ceterus 
paribus, an interpretation which does not generate this inconsistency would be preferred. 
However, the inconsistency is only apparent. Mozi’s reliance on the imperial ambitions of 
some rulers, and the love of conquest of many other rulers for his argument for shang xian 
does not entail that he endorses conquest as a just mode of acquisition himself. Mozi’s shang 
xian does not claim that a ruler should expand at the expense of his neighbours through 
conquest, and thus does not contradict Mozi’s claim that a ruler should not expand at the 
expense of his neighbours through conquest in his fei gong. In addition, a careful reading of 
Mozi’s fei gong would reveal that Mozi disapproves of the belief in conquest as a just mode of 
acquisition, and the military campaigns of conquest, but not the desire for miltiary glory and 
properties of the defeated. Mozi’s exact claim is a ruler should not engage in conquest, not 
that he should not even desire to engage in conquest. Insofar as Mozi’s shang xian secures 
one of the most important conditions for conquest, that is, a large army through 
demographic growth, he does not encourage the use of this army as an instrument of 
conquest. Hence, Mozi is simply relying on the prejudices and antecedent desires of his 
audience to persuade them to implement shang xian as a policy.  
                                                     
33 Mei, Condemnation of Offensive War (I), p196-201. Mozi’s polemic against conquest as an unjust mode 
of acquisition relies strictly upon the idea that war is simply theft and murder writ large. Unlike the 
other chapters of fei gong, Mozi did not use any arguments based on the idea that war is an 
unprofitable enterprise. See also Mei, Condemnation of Offensive War (II), p202-13 and Mei, Condemnation 
of Offensive War (III), p220-33 for the rest of Mozi’s polemic against conquest.  
34 MZ 9/70-1; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p94.  
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 In the second chapter of this work, my main claim is that shang xian is the necessary 
condition for the acquisition and preservation of a universal empire. Part of my argument 
involves the premise that the overthrow of xia dynasty by shang dynasty is achieved by 
military conquest. When these two ideas are taken together, it is evident that shang xian 
somehow contributes to the conquest of a previous dynasty by a later one. If Mozi endorses 
shang xian as a means of acquiring universal empires and dynasties are invariably founded by 
military conquests, then he seems to be endorsing conquest in shang xian. To avoid this 
inconsistency now expressed in a stronger form, one solution is to recall that Mozi’s fei gong 
contains a distinction between gong and zhu, where the latter denotes a punishment of errant 
rulers by a legitimate authority such as Tang’s punishment of Jie and Wu’s punishment of 
Zou.35 These coincide with the founding of shang dynasty and zhou dynasty respectively. 
Mozi’s distinction between gong and zhu allows the founding of dynasties to be excluded 
from the category of conquest itself, thereby allowing the inconsistency to be avoided. 
Whether Mozi is justified in making such a distinction is not a question that can be answered 
in this work, but the interpretation of Mozi’s shang xian in this work, at least on the prima facie 
level, is not inconsistent with his other teachings.  
 
 
Conditions for shang xian 
 
 Mozi’s audience consists of hereditary rulers who desire the three goals of a wealthy 
polity, demographic growth, and judicial and political order. Mozi’s choice of this audience 
reflects his understanding of the politics of his time. The policy of shang xian involves the 
recognition of xian, and their subsequent promotion to government positions; only rulers 
possess the political power to implement shang xian as a policy. During Mozi’s time, the 
dominant principle of politics is that of hereditary succession, and thus there is no possibility 
of Mozi ever possessing the requisite political power to implement shang xian. Yet at the 
same time, the rulers are ignorant of shang xian as the solution to the problems of their 
political situation. The coming into being of shang xian as policy require the fulfillment of 
two conditions: Mozi’s teaching of shang xian to the rulers, and the rulers’ implementation of 
                                                     
35 See Mei, Condemnation of Offensive War (III), p220-6. Mozi’s distinction between gong and zhu seems 
to depend on the legitimatization of zhu by ‘supernatural’ phenomena.  
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shang xian. Hence shang xian requires the union of political knowledge and political power for 
its emergence into this world of hereditary politics. Unless a pure form of an elective system 
of politics exists, where the succession of rulers is elective rather than hereditary, Mozi’s 
implementation of shang xian on his own is impossible. Mozi’s shang xian therefore 










The first chapter has shown that all rulers do want the three goals of a wealthy polity, 
demographic growth, and judicial and political order, and that some rulers are driven by 
imperial ambitions to desire those goals, although all rulers may adopt shang xian as a policy 
for a variety of reasons. More importantly, that interpretation of rulers’ motives is not 
inconsistent with Mozi’s other teachings like fei gong. Mozi’s choice of hereditary rulers as his 
audience is also explained as part of his strategy to actualize shang xian. The rulers who are 
animated by imperial ambitions form the most important part of Mozi’s audience, since they 
would compel other rulers to create large powerful armies through shang xian as a response 
to their imperial aggression. Imperial ambitions, in the context of Mozi’s historical situation, 
imply the desire to found a dynasty that rules over a universal empire. The natural question 
to ask here is whether Mozi’s shang xian enables a ruler with imperial ambitions to found 
such a dynasty, and the objective of this chapter is to answer that question.  
 
 Mozi outlines an account of dynastic politics to show that shang xian is necessary for 
the founding and preservation of dynasties. At its natural limits of birth and death, a dynasty 
is invariably marked by its founder who is known as a sheng wang and his descendant who is 
known as a bao wang. This distinction between a sheng wang and a bao wang is traditionally 
understood as a moral one, where the former is a moral angel who deserves his gain of an 
empire while the latter is a moral devil who deserves his loss of an empire. The other aim of 
this chapter is to show that this distinction is understood by Mozi himself as a political one, 
where a sheng wang founds a dynasty on political knowledge while a bao wang loses his dynasty 
through political ignorance. Hence, this distinction between sheng wang and bao wang is crucial 
to Mozi’s account of dynastic politics.  
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Before Mozi’s account of dynastic politics is discussed, Graham’s interpretation of 
the distinction between sheng wang and bao wang must be discussed because he not only 
understands it as a moral one, but renders it superfluous to Mozi’s shang xian. In his 
investigations of Mozi’s justificatory strategies for his conclusions, Graham believes that 
Mozi mainly relies on three kinds of justifications. For our purposes, we only need to 
concern ourselves with the first and third viz. an action is justified if and only if an ancient 
sheng wang had done it, and an action is justified if and only if it benefits the community or 
mankind. Graham correctly points out that no action can be justified on the basis of ancient 
authority, albeit a moral authority and concludes that the first kind of justification is Mozi’s 
concession to the prejudices of his audience who remain bound by tradition. He then tries to 
show that the true basis of the first kind of justification is actually the third one: an action of 
a sheng wang is identified on the basis of whether it benefits the community or mankind. 
Graham’s interpretation is plausible, except for two defects. He assumes that Mozi had 
understood the distinction between sheng wang and bao wang in the traditional way, and that 
Mozi used this distinction as a justification for shang xian.  Both assumptions are wrong. 
Mozi understood the distinction as a political one and used the distinction to articulate his 
account of dynastic politics.  
 
 
Graham’s understanding of Mozi 
 
 In the English-speaking world of Mozi scholarship, Graham is a figure whose 
philosophical and philological work dominates any serious discussion of Mozi’s philosophy 
even today. Philological disagreements with Graham’s suggestions for a new ordering of the 
core of the Mozi text36 viz. chapters 8-39 exist, but his substantive conclusions are mostly  
widely accepted in the known literature on Mozi’s philosophy. Graham’s views on Mozi’s 
philosophy had been published in two books, the first is a monograph on later Mohism 
titled Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science while the second is a general history of pre-Qin 
                                                     
36 See Lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint For A Chinese Utopia, p11-13 for Graham’s position on 
the textual divisions of the core chapters (8– 39) of the Mozi text and p58–65 for Graham’s textual 
arguments for his position. Lowe’s reasons for rejecting Graham’s “new text divisions” are given on 
p12-13.  
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Chinese philosophy titled Disputers of the Tao. Their publications are separated by eleven 
years.37 Yet Graham never changed his views about Mozi’s philosophy in both works.38  
 
 Received opinion agrees with Graham’s position that the distinction between sheng 
wang and bao wang is inessential to Mozi’s shang xian, since the latter’s justification does not 
require any use of the former distinction at all. The distinction is simply superfluous and its 
presence in Mozi’s shang xian is explained by the prejudices of Mozi’s audience. The fact that 
the secondary literature on Mozi’s philosophy does not contain any discussion of this 
distinction is sufficient to prove the ubiquity of this opinion. Since my interpretation of this 
distinction contradicts Graham’s very influential view, there is a need to evaluate his position 
before setting forth my own position. In addition, an interrogation of Graham’s views on the 
distinction between sheng wang and bao wang in Mozi’s shang xian is equivalent to a critique of 
the secondary literature’s views on the same distinction, since both views are identical.  
 
 The core of Mozi’s philosophy, as Graham understands it, consists of three integral 
elements viz. the moral,39 the useful40 and the rational41 which distinguished Mozi’s thought 
from other philosophers of the pre-Qin period. He perceived the emergence of Mozi’s 
phillosophy as the beginning of rational discourse and explicit argumentation in the history 
of Chinese philosophy. He also recognized Mozi’s philosophy as a revolt against the 
inherited tradition of past dynasties and the philosophic tradtion inaugurated by Confucius. 42 
Mozi’s teachings are not merely novel, but fundamentally opposed to any tradition, and 
                                                     
37 Graham’s Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science was published in 1978 and his later book Disputers of 
the Tao was published in 1989.  
38 Compare Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, “The Mohist philosophy” p3-72. Compare 
Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p33-53. 
39 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, p45. “The Mohists were moralists before everything 
else.” 
40 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p34. Graham calls the category of the useful Mozi’s “most distinctive 
innovation.”  
41 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, p4. “They [the Mohists] are the first Chinese thinkers 
to defend their principles by rational debate.” Also Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p33. “Rational debate 
in China starts with the first rival of Confucius, Mo Ti (Mo-tzu)”  
42 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, p4. “Among the schools which competed in China 
during the age of the philosophers the first to challenge the heritage of Confucius (551-479 B.C.) 
were the Mohists.” Also Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p33. Graham titles his section on Mozi’s 
philosophy as “a radical reaction: Mo-Tzu”. Compare Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 
p135. Schwartz follows Graham’s Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science in his title “Mo-Tzu’s 
challenge.”  
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hence can no longer rely on an appeal to a tradition for their justification.43 As a result, Mozi 
is compelled by the novel content of his teachings to found rational discourse, where his 
assertions are justified by reastons rather than traditional authorities.  
 
 
Mozi’s three tests 
 
 For Graham, the heart of Mozi’s rational discourse is his three tests which are used 
to evaluate any opinion for its truth and utility.44 Most commentators agree with Graham’s 
judgement here. Mozi’s three tests for an opinion are its root (本), its source (原) and its 
utility (用) [translations mine]. The first involves measuring an opinion against “the deeds of 
the ancient sage kings (古者聖王之事)” to verify whether it has been taught or practised by 
one of the ancient sage kings. The second involves verifying the truth of an opinion with 
“the senses of hearing and sight of the common people (察百姓耳目之實)”. The third, the 
most important on Graham’s account, involves “adopting it [the opinion] in government 
and observing its benefits to the country and the people (廢以為刑政，觀其中國家百姓
人民之利).”45 Mozi himself used these three tests in the triad of fei ming (Against Fatalism) 
to assess the truth and utility of ming (fatalism), or the opinion that human efforts alone 
cannot overcome what is predetermined by ming. Graham generalizes these three tests from 
Mozi’s use of them on the particular opinion of ming to obtain Mozi’s general justificatory 
strategy for any particular opinion.  
 
 When applied to his own teachings like shang xian, Mozi’s first test may seem to 
justify them as true and useful. Graham, however, considers Mozi’s justificatory use of “the 
deeds of ancient sage kings” as one of the last vestiges of an unphilosophical tradition from 
which Mozi is struggling to liberate himself in the direction of rational discourse. From the 
logical point of view, past authority can never guarantee the truth or usefulness of any 
                                                     
43 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p36. “Since their doctrines are new the Mohists have to give reasons 
for them.”  
44 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, p3-72. Also Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p36-41.   
45 Mei, Anti-Fatalism (I), p366. MZ 35/6-10. See also Mei, Anti-Fatalism (II), p378; Anti-Fatalism (III), 
p 389 and MZ 36/3-4; 37/2-4.  
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opinion, no matter how great that authority was in the past. Any argument based on past 
authority is simply unsound because its basic premise that past authority, in this case ancient 
sage kings, is infallible either in knowledge or action is regarded as false by us. Moreover, we 
do not share this premise with either Mozi himself or his audience. Even though a particular 
opinion held by a person might be true, its truth does not depend that person holding it. 
Similarly, the fact that ancient sage kings did practice shang xian, even if this is a historical 
truth, does not entail that shang xian itself is a desirable and useful practice on the basis of 
this fact alone. The desirability and utility of shang xian are logically independent of whatever 
the ancient sage kings did. These considerations, I think, led Graham to conclude that 
Mozi’s first test cannot be taken seriously as a sound form of justification, unless it can be 
proven independently that the ancient sage kings are indeed infallible in the relevant senses.  
 
 
Graham’s reduction of Mozi’s first test to his third test 
 
 Since past authority cannot provide a rational foundation for any opinion, Mozi’s 
first test seems to imply that Mozi has not liberated himself from the tradition of ancient 
sage kings. Mozi’s shang xian seems, on this account of Mozi’s philosophy, to be justified on 
the claim that shang xian is one of the deeds of ancient sage kings or sheng wang.46 Graham also 
observed that past authority is ranked the first of Mozi’s three tests.47 These considerations 
may lead us, prima facie, to believe that past authority is sufficient to justify any practice for 
Mozi. However, this apparently reasonable conclusion is contradicted by Mozi’s 
conversation with a Confucian named Chengzi, where Mozi himself denies that the truth of 
an opinion depends on its proponent.48 Graham also interprets Mozi, on the basis of the 
same passage, to hold the belief that “the validity of an idea is independent of its 
proponent.”49  
                                                     
46 MZ 8/8, 16, 26;9/3, 14, 44, 65, 69, 74; 10/8-9, 20-21, 30, 47.  
47 See Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, p11. “This is notable as the first Chinese attempt 
to formulate principles of argumentation, but it still gives the first place to ancient authority.”  
48 Mei, Kung Meng, p476. MZ Gong Meng 48/58-9. Also Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p37.  
49 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, p25. See also Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p36 “The 
soundness of a thought has nothing to do with who thinks it.” and p37 “Except when casting an 
argument in dialogue form the Mohists do not name the author of a thesis; they discuss it on its own 
merits.”  
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 Graham’s view of Mozi seems to be self-contradictory here. On the one hand, he 
attributes to Mozi the belief that past authority justifies the truth and utility of an opinion on 
the basis of his study of Mozi’s three tests. On the other hand, he also attributes to Mozi the 
belief that the truth of a thought is independent of its thinker on the basis of Mozi’s dialogue 
with Chengzi. The contradiction, however, is only apparent. 50  Graham resolved it by 
reducing Mozi’s first test “the deeds of ancient sage kings” to his third test “adopting it [the 
opinion] in government and observing its benefits to the country and the people” and thus 
affirming that “the validity of an idea is independent of its proponent.” He accomplishes this 
reduction by thinking through how ancient sage kings or sheng wang are identified and 
concludes that this is done through Mozi’s third. He also assumed that sheng wang are moral 
exemplars. Graham’s solution, in his own words, to this apparent contradiction is as follows:  
 
The first and third tests, agreement with the practice of the sage kings and practical 
results, interact in Mohist thought. You distinguish the sage kings from the tyrants 
by whether their policies proved beneficial or harmful in practice; you adopt a new 
course for its practical effects and then search history for confirmation that the sage 
kings did the same; and you put your own thoughts in the mouths of those you 
identify as sages, knowing that since the thought is right the sage would have shared 
it.51 
 
Before a particular man can be identified as a sheng wang, his actions must first be known to 
benefit mankind. Similarly, a bao wang is identified on the basis of his actions which harm 
mankind. The distinction between sheng wang and bao wang is drawn on the basis of a prior 
distinction between actions which benefit and those which harm mankind. Without knowing 
whether a particular action is beneficial or harmful to mankind in the first place, the man 
who has performed that action cannot be determined as either a sheng wang or bao wang. 
Given that Mozi’s third test evaluates an action as either beneficial or harmful to mankind, it 
is evident that the distinction between sheng wang and bao wang is made on its basis. In other 
                                                     
50 In the eleven years, from Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science to Disputers of the Tao, Graham did not 
revise his opinion on Mozi’s position that “the validity of an idea is independent of its proponent” 
but his solution to the apparent contradiction is only found in his general history of Chinese 
philosophy, Disputers of the Tao, p39.  
51 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p39.  
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words, Graham holds that Mozi’s first test is actually founded on his third test.52 As a result, 
the sheng wang do not constitute a standard independent of reason for the assessment of any 
particular opinion (言); instead they embody the standard that has been discovered by 
reason.53 Past authority only has authority for Mozi insofar as it agrees with reason, and not 
because of its antiquity. 54 According to Graham’s interpretation, Mozi’s first and third tests 
are identical, that is, the deeds of sheng wang are that which benefit mankind. 55  
 
 Graham indirectly contributes to our knowledge of Mozi by showing that if Mozi’s 
first test is justificatory in nature, then it must reduce to his third test because the truth of an 
opinion is simply never justified by its antiquity. The obvious implication of Graham’s result 
is that the distinction between sheng wang and bao wang is inessential to Mozi’s argument for 
shang xian, since ‘history’ only confirms and not establish shang xian as necessary and 
desirable. Mozi’s use of past authority in the form of sheng wang and bao wang is a concession 
to his audience’s prejudice in favour of antiquity. 56  The distinction between sheng wang and 
bao wang adds nothing extra, in terms of either knowledge or force of argument, to Mozi’s 
shang xian.  
 
 Graham’s reduction of Mozi’s first test to his third rests on his recognition that the 
three tests are interrelated, in spite of their prima facie independence. His investigations of 
how Mozi’s three tests are related to each other are motivated by his belief that Mozi is a 
                                                     
52 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, p12. “The Mohist ... judges doctrines primarily 
by his third test, their practical consequences, and combs ancient documents (most of them 
professedly earlier than Chou) for supporting quotations ....” 
53 See Lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint For A Chinese Utopia, p80 Reports of ancient sheng wang’s 
practice of shang xian also do not, in his opinion, constitute logical arguments for the usefulness of 
shang xian. He does not read Mozi’s use of ancient sheng wang as a justification of the practice of shang 
xian, but as “illustrations of the practice.” 
54 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p38-9. “As critics of the Chou tradition the Mohists take their sage 
kings indifferently from the founders of all the Three Dynasties (Hsia, Shang, Chou) and the pre-
dynastic Yao and Shun. The appeal (but only in the Purist versions) is to the authority not of 
antiquity but of wisdom, not to ‘the former kings’ but to ‘the sage kings of old’.”   
55 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p39. “This implies that the third, the utilitarian test, outweighs any 
ancient authority which can be cited on the other side.”  
56 Lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint For A Chinese Utopia, p84. “In presenting his case to the rulers and 
literati of the Warring States, Mo tzu places his strongest emphasis on the arguments he thinks most 
likely to be effective: utility, benefit, and the precedent of the sage kings, but in his own system of 
values it seems probable that the approval of Heaven is the firmest support he can muster to 
demonstrate the suitability of his means.”  
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philosopher speaking to other philosophers rather than a political philosopher teaching an 
audience of rulers. For an analytic philosopher cannot accept any authority, no matter how 
ancient, as the rational foundation of his beliefs. Mozi’s use of the distinction between sheng 
wang and bao wang can only be explained by the demands of his rhetorical situation, where his 
audience’s uncritical acceptance of tradition means they hold opinions on the basis of their 
antiquity.  
 
The first chapter has shown that some rulers are driven by imperial ambitions to 
pursue those goals of a wealthy polity, demographic growth, and judicial and political order. 
Mozi needs to convince these rulers that shang xian is necessary for the founding and 
preservation of dynasties, so that they would adopt shang xian as a policy. Other rulers 
presumably need not be convinced of this, since they may adopt it for a variety of reasons, 
including the desire to enrich their impoverished polities, or build large armies to defend 
against imperial aggression. Given that Graham does not think Mozi’s distinction between 
sheng wang and bao wang is essential to his argument for shang xian, it follows that this 
distinction does not play a role in demonstrating the necessity of shang xian to the founding 
and preservation of dynasties. Graham seems to believe that Mozi’s audience are incapable 
of following strictly logical arguments, and thus Mozi’s use of the distinction is irrelevant for 
a philosophical reader like him.  
 
Graham, however, fails to ask the important question of why sheng wang are 
authorities for Mozi’s audience.  He only saves Mozi’s distinction between sheng wang and bao 
wang on the basis of understanding it in a particular way viz. a moral distinction. Graham was 
led to ‘discover’ how Mozi grounds his distinction in a new way, that is, the reduction of his 
first test to the third, by two basic beliefs. Firstly, he had thought of the distinction as a form 
of justification. Secondly, he retains the traditional belief that sheng wang are perfect models of 
morality while bao wang are models of moral evil. These considerations lead us to conclude 
that Mozi’s audience seek to model themselves after sheng wang for moral reasons. The fact 
that sheng wang are identified, on Graham’s account, on the basis of their moral deeds only 




Critique of Graham’s position 
 
 At the heart of Mozi’s moral philosophy is his attempt, on Graham’s account, to 
connect the notion of utility (用) with the idea of morality, where utility forms the ultimate 
criterion for moral value. Mozi holds that “what is moral is that which is useful, and what is 
useful is that which is moral.” 57  Graham’s reduction only saves Mozi’s rationality by 
interpreting his distinction between sheng wang and bao wang as derived from the more basic 
category of utility or the useful. On the basis of Mozi’s third test, sheng wang are identified as 
men who perform useful deeds while bao wang are men who perform useless deeds. Graham 
then already understands Mozi’s distinction as a moral one, since he identifies the category 
of the useful with that of the moral. But he fails to ask how Mozi and his audience 
understand this distinction itself. Mozi may not think of his distinction in justificatory terms, 
and his audience of rulers may not interpret sheng wang as moral models.  
 
 One of the most obvious defects of Graham’s approach is his inadequate definition 
of sheng wang. His method would identify far more men as sheng wang than the few individuals 
found in Mozi’s triad of shang xian. 58 Mozi names Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen and Wu as sheng 
wang and Jie, Zou, Yu and Li as bao wang. Graham may object that it was not Mozi’s intention 
to provide a comprehensive list of all sheng wang, only representative ones are named. This 
move, however, does not get rid of our original difficulty; it merely begs the question of 
what those few sheng wang represent. The refusal to consider the possibility that Mozi’s list is 
the result of his deliberate choice blinds us to Mozi’s analysis of dynastic politics.  
 
                                                     
57 See MZ, 16/21-22; Mei Universal Love (III), p178. Mozi asserts, in the form of a rhetorical question, 
the identity between a moral (善) deed and a useful (用) deed. Since Graham believes that Mozi’s 
whole philosophy is divided into ten teachings, on the basis of their contents, it is reasonable to infer 
that Graham would accept Mozi’s assertion of this identity, rather than a statement restricted to the 
context of jian ai C, as constitutive of Mozi’s philosophical core.  
58 Graham’s method involves applying Mozi’s third test to the domain of all past rulers, dividing 
them into two main categories: (1) rulers whose deeds are useful and moral; (2) rulers whose deeds 
are useless and immoral, thereby distinguishing sheng wang from bao wang. The tacit assumption of 
Graham’s method is that sheng wang resembles Mozi in performing moral deeds motivated by moral 
intentions. This particular definition of sheng wang yielded by Graham’s method is inadequate because 
it fails to account for, not only the number of sheng wang, but more importantly, Mozi’s list on its own 
terms. Graham had assumed that he knows Mozi’s exact intentions, with respect to the use of 
ancient authority, without truly investigating Mozi’s true intentions.  
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 A single observation about Mozi’s list of sheng wang and bao wang suffices to renew 
our attempt to inquire into the ground of the authority of sheng wang for Mozi’s audience. 
The most obvious difference, overlooked by those who do not seek to begin reading Mozi’s 
teaching of shang xian, from the perspective of his audience, is political – sheng wang acquired, 
by their own efforts, universal empire while bao wang lost their inherited universal empire. In 
short, sheng wang are political successes and bao wang are political failures. In the first chapter 
of this essay, it has been established that Mozi’s political audience of rulers passionately hope 
to acquire their own universal empire, and fear to lose their inherited guos. Consequently, the 
distinction between sheng wang and bao wang, on this surface reading, is politically meaningful 
to Mozi’s audience who only seek to imitate sheng wang for the purpose of fulfilling their 
passionate longing for universal empire. The rhetorical argument for shang xian, rooted in the 
political hopes and fears of Mozi’s audience, then is the practice of shang xian made it 
possible for sheng wang to acquire the universal empire.  
 
The hypothesis that there was historically no such figures like sheng wang and bao wang 
would change nothing in the hermeneutical task of offering an account of the authority of 
sheng wang and bao wang for Mozi’s political audience of rulers. Often commentators make the 
mistake of thinking that Mozi’s use of ancient authority, in the form of sheng wang and bao 
wang, has the purpose of justifying shang xian by historical precedents – the possibility of 
shang xian is confirmed by the deeds of ancient sage kings. My reading of ‘the deeds of 
ancient sage kings’, counter to all such ‘historical’ readings, justifies shang xian, from the 
perspective of Mozi’s political audience, as necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of the 
universal empire. Such misreadings result from the extension of Mozi’s use of ancient 
authority, in his teaching of jian ai, to justify the practice of jian ai by the historical precedents 
of the deeds of ancient sage kings – jian ai can and should be done now because it is one of 
the deeds of ancient sage kings59 – to Mozi’s teaching of shang xian. The possibility of shang 
xian as a practice is easily demonstrated by the philosophic argument, found in Mozi’s 
teaching of shang xian, that a ruler lacking the capability to kill an ox is compelled to use a 
butcher. This example, rooted in our everyday experience, is supposed to show, in this 
context, the use of a butcher is a form of shang xian. To summarize the results of our 
investigation so far: Mozi’s political audience of rulers seeks to imitate the political successes 
                                                     
59 Mei, Universal Love (II) jian ai B p168-172; Mei, Universal Love (III) jian ai C p184-190.  
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of sheng wang, thereby hoping to fulfill their ardent desire for ruling universally. This reading, 
not yet our final reading of Mozi’s distinction, which has its genesis in Graham’s reduction, 
interprets the rhetorical function of Mozi’s distinction as showing, from the perspective of 
Mozi’s audience, that shang xian is necessary and sufficient for the acquisition of the universal 
empire.  
 
Confronted with this result, Graham need not at all abandon his interpretation of the 
distinction as a distinction in moral value. The new reading developed here, against the 
counter-reading of the distinction between sheng wang and bao wang as political difference, strictly 
speaking, is not Graham’s own, but an attempted continuation of his original reading. The 
tradition’s understanding of sheng wang as moral rulers and bao wang as immoral rulers is 
preserved here by thoroughly assimilating politics to morality. This moral reading does not 
deny that the practice of shang xian necessarily enables a hereditary ruler of a guo, whatever its 
size, to acquire the universal empire; it only adds the new fundamental assertion that only 
moral rulers practice shang xian. No longer is it the case that the morality of sheng wang is 
inferred, on the performance of Graham’s reduction, from the fact that shang xian has moral 
consequences – the morality of sheng wang, now assumed rather than proved, becomes the 
ground for the possibility of shang xian itself! Although shang xian still remains the sine qua non 
condition for the possibility of political success, the fulfillment of this condition is ultimately 
dependent on the morality of the ruler. This moralizing move fully subordinates politics to 
morality. The logical possibility of an immoral sheng wang, to say nothing of a moral bao wang, 
is completely rejected – no ruler, without being moral, will practice shang xian, and thereby 
acquire nor preserve the universal empire.  
 
Consequently, with this new criterion for distinguishing sheng wang from bao wang, the 
distinction itself retains its moral character upon a postulated relation of necessity between 
politics and morality. The crucial premise, at the heart of this new moralized reading, is that 
immoral men never perform deeds with moral consequences, like shang xian, for moral 
intentions.60 In short, even if a man performs a deed with moral effects, without the essential 
element of intending to realize these moral effects, this man cannot be, strictly speaking, 
                                                     
60 See MZ 49/36-38; Mei, Lü Wen, p496. Mozi’s advice, in that situation of dialogue, clearly discloses 
the importance of the concept of intention (志) for determining the morality of a man.  
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moral.61 Sheng wang then are moral men who performed shang xian for the sake of morality 
itself: they intended the moral effects from the practice of shang xian itself, and the universal 
empire was their unintended reward for their morality. In other words, the Xian must be, 
according to this interpretation, cherished by sheng wang for their own sake. This condition – 
the intentions of sheng wang must be absolutely moral – is essential for this interpretation of 
the distinction between sheng wang and bao wang as a distinction in moral value. If the 
intentions of sheng wang were otherwise, the whole interpretation would collapse. A sheng wang 
then is bound by such a reading to two negative conditions, of which the negation of any 
implies the death of the moral interpretation of the distinction. Firstly, a sheng wang cannot 
intend to acquire the universal empire, through the practice of shang xian, since this would 
imply that his intention was not moral, but political, and consequently, the distinction would 
lose its moral character. Secondly, he cannot fail to acquire the universal empire, or else the 
interpretation cannot account for the textual observation that all sheng wang are political 
successes while all bao wang are political failures.  
 
Such a subordination of politics to morality indeed contradicts the textual evidence 
of Mozi’s teaching of shang xian. This is not Mozi’s understanding of politics – morality is not 
the ground of political success as such. The texts of shang Xian A and B themselves in fact 
explicitly reject the moral position that the rewarding of xian, by sheng wang, is motivated by 
the love of the xian themselves. The rewarding of xian, itself part of the practice of shang xian, 
is grounded in sheng wang’s desire for political success.62 Moreover, other texts in shang xian B 
                                                     
61 Mozi is, almost always, read as a consequentialist who sees the moral in terms of consequences: an 
action, or a deed, is moral if and only if it produces moral effects. See Nivison, The Classical 
Philosophical Writings, who characterized Mozi’s whole philosophy as “consequentialist thinking.” This 
belief is representative of the terrain of interpretations, on Mozi’s philosophy, in the English-
speaking world. Often overlooked, in such readings, is the simple necessity that the consequentialist 
himself, insofar as consequentialism is a form of moral thinking, must always intend to realize those 
moral consequences of his actions. If not, he cannot be said to be acting morally. A utilitarian, a kind 
of consequentialist, when faced with the extreme choice of either permitting his own wife to be shot, 
or permitting other twenty unrelated people to be shot, knows that the correct moral decision is the 
former alternative. But, if accidentally, in his moments of vacillation, before he made his decision, the 
gun misfired and killed his wife, the utilitarian himself cannot be said to act morally since his decision 
did not contribute, according to utilitarianism, to the correct moral outcome.  
62 See Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (I), p66; MZ 8/19. “To place these three (honours) upon the 
virtuous is not so much to reward virtue, as to bring about the success of the enterprise (of 
government).” 非為賢賜也，欲其事之成．Also MZ 9/16-17; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), 
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assert, in the context of describing the politics of sheng wang63 and bao wang64, that the presence 
of shang xian is the ground for the political success of sheng wang65 and the absence of shang 
xian as the reason for the political failure of bao wang.66 The direct attitude of sheng wang 
towards xian, and hence, indirectly the practice of shang xian, can be discerned through a 
poetic line, found in shang xian B, cited by Mozi – “who can handle the heat without rinsing 
his hands (in cold water)?”67 Mozi himself offers an interpretation of this line, immediately 
following his citation, which compares the political necessity of shang xian to the physical 
necessity of “rinsing in handling hot objects to relieve the hands.”68 These objects must be 
handled when they are hot; if not, rinsing would not be absolutely necessary. These two lines 
express, by themselves, how shang xian, in essence, is perceived by Mozi, and subsequently, 
by the political audience he seeks to persuade. Clearly, this crucial text proves that shang xian 
was never presented by Mozi, in all three texts, Shang Xian A, B and C, as a moral teaching. 
The resemblance between shang xian and using a thin film of water to protect one’s hands 
from being burned by hot objects which one must handle singularly consists in treating Xian, 
like the film of water, as a mere means to one’s end.  
 
From these textual considerations, we obtain the result that sheng wang did not 
willingly perform shang xian, out of the love of morality, rather they were compelled, by the 
knowledge that shang xian is necessary for political success, to perform shang xian. In other 
words, if shang xian were not an absolute political necessity, then sheng wang would not 
perform it, even if shang xian itself is a moral deed. Having negated the first negative 
                                                                                                                                                              
p78. “And all this was done not merely to reward their subordinates; it was to fulfill their trust.” 故古
聖王高予之爵，重予之祿，任之以事，斷予之令，夫豈為其臣賜哉，欲其事之成也． 
63 Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p72-76. MZ 9/3-14.  
64 Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p . MZ 9/24-31.  
65 See Mei, p76; MZ, 9/14. “Now the way that enabled the sage-kings of the Three Dynasties, namely 
Yao, Shun, Yü, T’ang, Wen and Wu, to rule the empire and head the feudal lords was no other than 
this (principle of exaltation of the virtuous).” 故唯昔三代聖王堯、舜、禹、湯、文、武，之所
以王天下正諸侯者，此亦其法已． 
66 Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p82; MZ, 9/31-32. “Now, the reason that the wicked kings of the 
Three Dynasties namely, Chieh, Chow, Yu, and Li, misruled the country and upset their states was 
no other than this (employment of the vicious).” 故雖昔者三代暴王桀紂幽厲之所以失措其國
家，傾覆其社稷者，已此故也． 
67 See Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p78, note 1. Mei traced the citation back to its original source 
in the Shi Jing.  
68 Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p78.  
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condition demanded by the integrity of the moral interpretation of the sheng wang–bao wang 
distinction, we must conclude that the difference between sheng wang and bao wang is not 
moral, but political. Sheng wang acted for the sake of acquiring and preserving the universal 
empire; their intentions are purely political. Mozi’s shang xian then is a political teaching 
addressed to a political audience.  
 
All interpretations of Mozi’s distinction as one in moral value ultimately derive from 
the unexpressed decision to seeing the fundamental relationship between the distinction 
itself and Mozi’s teaching of shang xian as justificatory. The ‘fact’ that shang xian is a deed of 
ancient sage kings, on Graham’s account, was found to be philosophically inadequate, but 
rhetorically adequate, to justify the practical conclusion that political rulers should practice 
shang xian. Since other justifications, possibly better ones, other than this particular 
distinction, may be given for Mozi’s teaching of shang xian, the distinction itself is, from this 
standpoint, extrinsic to and never an intrinsic part of Mozi’s teaching. Graham’s very 
reduction, an operation which finds its originary motive in the faith that reason is the only 
authority for Mozi, rests on this crucial decision. But this decision obscures a very important 
question: why did sheng wang themselves practice shang xian, or equivalently, why shang xian is 
a deed of sheng wang?  
 
The philosophic core of Mozi’s teaching of shang xian is constituted by the single 
proposition that shang xian is the root of politics. 69  No extant interpretation of Mozi’s 
teaching of shang xian, in the English-speaking world, took this proposition seriously enough 
to make it the center of their reading. Our previous destruction of Graham’s moral reading 
will prove itself to be the operation necessary to make this formerly hidden question, and 
subsequently the whole inquiry into whether shang xian is truly the root of politics, accessible 
to us. Since the grounding decision of Graham’s reading led to interpretive results, which are 
contrary to textual evidence, it is to be rejected. Consequently, the fundamental relationship 
                                                     
69 This proposition, which appears in all three texts of shang Xian, is explicitly stated by Mozi himself. 
It expresses Mozi’s philosophic understanding about the activity of politics, its root, and is not part 
of the activity itself. Being the heart of Mozi’s shang Xian teaching itself, it is justified, on this very 
ground, to characterize Mozi’s shang Xian as a political teaching, and not a moral one. This ground is 
a stronger reason for this political characterization than the fact that Mozi’s distinction between sheng 
wang and bao wang is a political distinction. This point is not trivial. Only by establishing that Mozi 
teaches politics makes possible the recovery of Mozi as a political philosopher.  
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between Mozi’s distinction and his teaching of shang xian, on my account of Mozi’s teaching 
of shang xian, is explanatory: sheng wang practiced shang xian because shang xian is the root of 
politics; the inverse – shang xian is the root of politics because sheng wang practiced shang xian 
– is false. The practical conclusion that political rulers should practice shang xian then is 
justified, on the philosophic level, by Mozi’s teaching that shang xian is the root of politics.  
 
Mozi himself arrived at this insight into the root of politics through a methodical 
reflection upon the deeds of former kings and teachings of sheng wang.70 The distinction, 
consequently, is attained by reflection upon the tradition, and not accepted on the basis of 
faith in the authority of the tradition; it forms an essential element of Mozi’s teaching of 
shang xian: the distinction itself, suspending the question of the actuality or fictional character 
of sheng wang and bao wang, contains an analysis of dynastic politics, in which Mozi’s audience 
are political actors par excellence, and a critique of the hereditary principle of succession, the 
theoretical foundation presupposed by the practice of shang xian. The explication of shang 
xian as the root of politics can therefore be completed only when we succeed in gaining an 
adequate understanding of Mozi’s distinction between sheng wang and bao wang. We are 
compelled by our present inquiry to study, carefully and attentively, the deeds of sheng wang 
and bao wang.  
 
The entire class of ancients, constituted by the smaller classes of sheng wang and bao 
wang, even when taken together, is simply not identical with the complete class of universal 
rulers. It is not clear, at first, other than the hypothesis that Mozi merely took over the 
names of sheng wang and bao wang from the tradition, how Mozi himself understood the lists 
of sheng wang and bao wang. The entire class of sheng wang, which is enumerated in 
chronological order, consists of six individuals whose proper names are Yao (堯), Shun (舜), 
Yu (禹), Tang (湯), Wen (文), and Wu (武). They appear, at first glance, to be counted as a 
single class because they all practiced shang xian but on closer inspection, they differ in their 
modes of acquisition of universal rule. The first three individuals – Yao, Shun and Yu – 
became universal rulers on the basis of election. Shun, according to Mozi’s account, was 
recognized as xian, and elected to universal rule by Yao who then was already a universal 
                                                     
70 Mei, Lü’s Question (Lü Wen), p498; MZ 49/47.  
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ruler himself; likewise, Yu was, in turn, later recognized as xian, and elected to universal rule 
by Shun. The general principle of succession for this group of sheng wang, which is 
continuous from Yao to Yu, is elective: each universal ruler elects a man, on the ground that 
he is xian, to be his successor. This is an act of shang xian in its highest form.71  It is 
noteworthy that both Shun and Yu, before they were elected to become universal rulers, 
were private individuals of lowly birth and poverty.72 These men will be referred to, in the 
rest of this essay, as the first universal rulers. On the other hand, the last three individuals – 
Tang, Wen and Wu – became universal rulers, not on the basis of election, but by 
overcoming an existing dynasty ruling over the universal empire, and founding their own 
dynasty. In other words, they became universal rulers by their own efforts. Tang founded the 
Shang dynasty while Wen and Wu, father and son, together founded the Zhou dynasty. These 
men will be referred, in the rest of this essay, as the founders. Unlike Shun and Yu, the 
founders were hereditary rulers of guos, which form a part of the universal empire ruled by a 
hereditary universal ruler. This divide in the class of sheng wang corresponds exactly to the 
distinction between the elective system and the hereditary system of politics. At this point of 
our inquiry, the distinction is made between two groups of sheng wang, the first universal 
rulers and the founders, on the basis of the difference in the modes of acquisition of 
universal rule, to lay the ground for both our exposition of Mozi’s philosophic analysis of 
dynastic politics, in which the highest form of shang xian is no longer possible, and his 
philosophic critique of dynastic politics. The first universal rulers – Yao, Shun and Yu – do 
not belong to the world of dynastic politics, and consequently the analysis of dynastic 
politics does not involve the use of the first universal rulers. Since a critique of dynastic, or 
hereditary, politics presupposes an understanding of it, the exposition of Mozi’s philosophic 





                                                     
71 See MZ 9/46-47 for Yao’s acquisition (得)of Shun, and his elevation of Shun to universal rule (舉
以為天子) and MZ 9/53 for the description of this act as ‘為賢’. Also Mei, Exaltation of The Virtuous 
(II), p86 and p88.  
72 See MZ 9/47 for Shun’s lowly birth and poverty.  
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Mozi’s analysis of dynastic politics 
 
Before we turn to Mozi’s analysis of dynastic politics, which is a kind of political 
education, and Mozi’s critique of hereditary politics, which is a kind of philosophic education, 
we must first learn how Mozi himself leads his audience of political men to the recognition 
of a need in themselves for such an education. To do so, it is necessary to see that the two 
terms of the fundamental distinction among sheng wang and bao wang, when taken together, 
form the whole class of ancient rulers, or simply, the ancients (古者/昔者 ) that is 
distinguished from the entire class of modern rulers (今者王公大人), or simply, Mozi’s 
contemporaries (今者). This new fundamental distinction between the ancients and moderns, 
which is highlighted by Mozi’s constant juxtaposition of the expressions (今者王公大人), 
‘ancient sheng wang’ (昔者三代聖王) and ‘ancient bao wang’ (昔者三代暴王), with each other, 
functions to reveal the political situation of Mozi’s contemporaries, as seen through Mozi’s 
eyes, to themselves.  
 
Mozi’s contemporaries, as we learned from the first chapter, desire to become 
universal rulers, and what prevents them from doing so is their ignorance of shang xian as the 
root of politics. There are only three modes of acquisition of universal rule, and they are: (1) 
elected by an existing universal ruler like Yao’s election of Shun; (2) by one’s own efforts like 
Tang’s founding of Shang dynasty; and (3) inheriting the universal empire like the bao wang. 
Since Mozi’s contemporaries did not inherit a universal empire, they are merely hereditary 
rulers of guos, and there is no universal ruler in existence, or at least the Zhou house, after the 
existence of the ba system, is only nominally the ruling dynasty, none of Mozi’s 
contemporaries can acquire universal rule by the first or third modes. We will only note here 
that the transition from the elective system of politics to the hereditary, or dynastic, system 
of politics seems irreversible. This observation will be subsequently explained in our 
exposition of Mozi’s critique of hereditary, or dynastic, politics. Furthermore, when the 
change from the elective system to the hereditary system occurred, all sheng wang, that is to 
say, the founders, are all hereditary rulers of guos. In other words, it was no longer possible, 
when the hereditary system of politics comes into being, for private individuals to become 
universal rulers. One necessary condition for the acquisition of universal rule, in the political 
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situation in which Mozi’s contemporaries find themselves, is the hereditary rule of a guo. 
Hence, Mozi’s contemporaries can only become universal rulers by founding a new dynasty 
to replace the Zhou dynasty, and their imitation of the ancients should be understood as the 
imitation of founders.  
 
For Mozi’s contemporaries to fulfill their desire to found a new dynasty, and thereby 
making it possible for their own families to rule universally, they would have to know the 
conditions of possibility for the existence of dynasties. Mozi himself indicates that the 
foundations of dynasties are his subject by three textual details. Firstly, the existence of a 
dynasty is marked by the founder who founds it and the bao wang who ends it. For example, 
the beginning of the Shang dynasty is marked by Tang and its end marked by Zou. Tang and 
Zou belong to the same family, and are related to each other in an ancestor-descendant 
relation: Tang is the ancestor of Zou. The study of Tang and Zou consequently will tell us 
the reasons for the rise and fall of Shang dynasty. But Mozi’s contemporaries, like us, are not 
simply interested in the rise and fall of a particular dynasty. For them to truly possess the 
knowledge of the conditions of possibility for any dynasty, they would have to know the 
reasons for the rise and fall of any dynasty. Mozi does, in fact, teach this knowledge, and to 
see that, we need to look at the class of bao wang more closely. The whole class of bao wang 
consists of four individuals whose proper names are Jie (桀), Zou (紂), You (幽), and Li 
(厲).73 The chronological order of the dynasties is Xia, Shang and Zhou: Jie was the last ruler 
of Xia, Zou was the last ruler of Shang, and both You and Li were last rulers of western 
Zhou. Other than the Tang-Zou pair, both You and Li, on inspection, can be paired with 
Wen and Wu since Wen and Wu founded the Zhou dynasty, and You and Li ended it. Jie 
cannot be paired because the founder of Xia is not mentioned. Subsequently, this absence 
would be accounted for in Mozi’s critique of hereditary, or dynastic, politics. The fact that 
the last two bao wang are rulers of Zhou, despite the fact that the Zhou house still exists, 
albeit nominally, indicates indirectly Mozi’s opinion that Zhou dynasty is finished, and the 
time for the founding of a new dynasty is here.  
 
                                                     
73 Unlike the list of sheng wang, the list of bao wang is not enumerated in chronological order: the father 
of You (r. 781-771 B.C.) Xuan, and You himself is the grandson of Li (857 B.C.). See Edward L. 
Shaughnessy, “Western Zhou History,” The Cambridge History of Ancient China, p342-351 for details.  
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Secondly, not a single hegemon of the ba system of politics is cited by Mozi as a 
model of imitation. After the fall of western Zhou, the ba system of politics dominated the 
Spring and Autumn period.74 The ba (lit. the senior one)75 stands as a first among equals, or 
primus inter pares, among the feudal lords. Since the ba is still nominally a vassal of the Zhou 
king, a ba does not found a dynasty, and hence his greatest political deed – becoming a ba – 
is not as great as any of the founders. Mozi’s deliberate silence on the most manifest political 
phenomenon (the ba system) in the historical period closest to his own time indicates that 
the subject of his discussion is not the acquisition of de facto universal rule, while keeping the 
pretense of being a vassal of the Zhou king, but the founding of a dynasty.  
 
Thirdly, Mozi did not mention the hereditary universal rulers who ruled, between the 
founders and the bao wang. These men are naturally divided, according to the dynasty they 
belong to, into three groups, since there are only three dynasties: Xia, Shang and Zhou. All of 
them were the descendants of the original founder of the dynasty, and their greatest political 
deed, opposed to both the founders and the ba, is to preserve their inheritance of the 
universal empire. Hence, they will be known, in the rest of this essay, as the preservers. The 
complete class of universal rulers then consists of the first universal rulers, the founders, the 
preservers and the bao wang. The first two categories, as we know, constitute the class of sheng 
wang. It is a significant fact that the preservers who form almost the whole, in term of 
numbers, of the complete class of universal rulers are not even mentioned by Mozi. This can 
only be deliberate. Since the preservers did not, unlike the bao wang, lose their inherited 
universal empires to others, that is to say, a founder of a new dynasty, they must have 
practiced shang xian too, although they did not apply the principle of shang xian to the 
succession to universal rule. The reason for their deliberate absence cannot be the absence 
of shang xian from their political activity, which is aimed at the preservation of their 
inheritance within their own families. The only reason, derived from comparing the greatest 
political deeds of the first universal rulers, the founders and the bao wang, is Mozi’s subject of 
discussion – the foundations of dynasties – naturally exclude them.  
 
                                                     
74 See Cho-Yun Hsu, “The Spring and Autumn Period,” The Cambridge History of Ancient China, p551-
66 for an account of the Ba system.  
75 See Cho-Yun Hsu, “The Spring and Autumn Period,” The Cambridge History of Ancient China, p552.  
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We have ascertained Mozi’s principle of selecting rulers from the complete class of 
universal rulers, that is to say, we have explained why the list of sheng wang consists of the six 
individuals, and why the list of bao wang consists of the four individuals, and only those men, 
and on this basis, we determined that Mozi’s subject of discussion is the foundations of 
dynasties, or the conditions of possibility for the existence of dynasties. These conditions 
can be learned by comparing the differences between the following categories of universal 
rulers: the founders, the preservers, and the bao wang.  
 
Mozi’s fundamental insight into hereditary politics is its dynastic nature: the rule of a 
single family over other families which aspire, in turn, to universal rule, that is to say, replace 
the ruling dynasty as ruling family, or founding a new dynasty. The dynastic cycles 
exemplified by the replacement of Xia by Shang, and Shang by Zhou, derive from the 
fundamental desire of every family, in the context of hereditary politics, to rule universally. 
As long as politics retains its dynastic form, and it is dominated by the hereditary principle of 
succession, political struggle will always consist of the struggle of every family against each 
other. Consequently, kinship is the basis of this form of politics. Since all three dynasties – 
Xia, Shang and Zhou – exhibit the same pattern of rise and fall, a dynasty is founded by a 
founder, and it ends with a bao wang, the typical history of a dynasty can be understood by 
comparing the following pair: Jie and Tang.  
 
The bao wang, all of them, lost their inheritance of the universal empire, and ended 
the dynasty. They also lost their lives. The absence of shang xian, from the politics of bao wang, 
is the reason for the political failure of bao wang. Perhaps, the bao wang did not practice shang 
xian because they did not know of shang xian: one cannot do what one does not know of. 
Now, Mozi’s contemporaries are truly ignorant of shang xian as the root of politics, and 
Mozi’s teaching of shang xian cites the ancient writings to ‘prove’ that those who succeeded 
politically, in the past, knew that shang xian is the root of politics. Since the bao wang, being 
hereditary universal rulers, lack the political experience of founding a dynasty, they may, 
plausibly on this ground, be ignorant of shang xian. The politics of sheng wang is supposed, on 
Mozi’s account, to exhibit knowledge of shang xian. Given that the founders left behind 
writings of their own political knowledge and activity for their descendants, it follows that 
the descendants of the original founders possess the knowledge of shang xian. If we consider 
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that the only relevant difference between a bao wang and a preserver is that the bao wang 
ended the dynasty while the preserver preserved the dynasty, although both are descendants 
of the same founder, hereditary rulers, and lack the political experience of founding a 
dynasty, it follows that the bao wang too knew about shang xian. The reason therefore for the 
political failure of bao wang, possibly the greatest political failures, since the least amount of 
effort is required of them to retain their inherited possession of the universal empire, is their 
hubristic refusal to practice shang xian.  
 
Jie was the last ruler of Xia dynasty, and he is a bao wang. The founder of his dynasty, 
his ancestor, left behind writings about shang xian, and his immediate ancestors, the 
preservers of Xia between the founder of Xia and Jie, practiced shang xian, so Jie knew that 
shang xian is the root of politics from the writings of the founder, and reports about the 
politics of his ancestors. Furthermore, the writings are only, on Mozi’s account, intended by 
the founder for his descendants. This implies that Tang, a vassal of Jie, could not have 
learned about shang xian from either the writings of the founder of Xia or the politics of Jie 
who did not practice shang xian. Tang must have discovered that shang xian is the root of 
politics by his own efforts. The very fact that Tang founded Shang presupposes that Tang 
both possessed the knowledge of shang xian, and practiced shang xian. In other words, taking 
Tang as representative of founders in general, the founders did not succeed by chance, but 
from knowledge. From all these considerations, the conditions of possibility for the 
existence of any dynasty are: (1) being a hereditary of a guo; (2) the knowledge of shang xian; 
and (3) the practice of shang xian.  
 
Given that the founders left behind writings for their descendants76 to make certain 
the continuity of the dynasties they founded, and the fact that the founders discovered the 
knowledge of shang xian by their own efforts, it seems that they did not trust their 
descendants to discover the same knowledge by their own efforts. The writings of the 
founders consequently seek to fulfill the second condition of possibility. Mozi’s teaching of 
shang xian, which is addressed to all hereditary rulers of guos of his time, stands in the same 
                                                     
76 Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (III), p102-4.  
“Having understood the principle of exalting the virtuous in government, the ancient sage-kings 
inscribed it on bamboos and silk and engraved it on the dishes and vases, to hand it down to their 
descendants.” 
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relation to his audience as the founders’ writings to their descendants. Hence, the only 
condition that any of Mozi’s contemporaries need to satisfy, in the light of Mozi’s teaching 
of shang xian, is the third condition. In other words, none of Mozi’s contemporaries need to 
be men who are capable of discovering the knowledge of shang xian on their own; they only 
need to follow the path opened to them by Mozi who claimed to ground his teaching of 









Mozi’s concept of xian is a neglected subject of research; previous research often 
offer a definition of this concept, without proceeding any further in their inquiry. The 
received interpretation of Mozi’s shang xian, most clearly represented by the work of Nivison, 
understands Mozi’s argument as the explicit formulation of an original Confucian teaching, 
that is, “lordly employers should give officies to men who are worthy, rather than to men 
who have the right aristocratic connections.”77 His closest definition of what constitutes 
‘worthy’ is that of “a good man” who “is one who has the abilities that would enable him to 
give effective service in such a government [Mozi’s definition of a good, or moral, 
government] if employed and properly paid to remain loyal.”78 Nivison interprets Mozi’s 
concept of xian from the point of view of Confucius’ teachings in the Analects, thus tacitly 
excludes the possibility that it is a sui generis concept.79 He did not see that Mozi regards the 
essential difference between a moral man and an immoral man as a lack of a specific ability, 
somewhat similar to the difference between an archer and a non-archer. More importantly, 
he did not see that Mozi’s philosophic originality lies in justifying acquisition as a moral 
activity. Other studies devoted to Mozi’s philosophy do not offer alternative understandings 
of Mozi’s concept of xian, and suffer from similar defects.80  
 
                                                     
77 Nivison, CPW, p760.  
78 Nivison, CPW, p761. See Nivison’s note 16 for his textual sources of his two definitions of Mozi’s 
good government and good man.  
79 Nivison’s idea of Mozi’s xian as a man who “has the abilities that would enable him to give 
effective service” and loyalty in exchange for money seems close to my definition, except that the 
government in which he serves is understood to be moral by Nivison. My interpretation of Mozi’s 
xian differs from Nivison’s implicit Confucian intrepretation in the motivation underlying a man’s 
decision to become xian, in Mozi’s sense.  
80 See Lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia, p78-9. Also Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 
p45.  
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In this chapter, I will defend the following claims with regards to Mozi’s concept of 
xian. Firstly, Mozi’s xian share a common psychology of acquisition with non-xian; both xian 
and non-xian, from Mozi’s point of view, desire to acquire wealth and honour. Mozi’s xian 
are better at acquiring wealth and honour from rulers because they possess abilities that are 
useful to the latter. Secondly, morality is understood as a kind of ability, on this view, that 
satisfies the basic desire for acquisition. The philosophical tradition inaugurated by 
Confucius opposes morality to acquisition, and a moral man, from the view of this tradition, 
always prefers morality over acquisition of wealth and honour. Insofar as the term ‘xian’ 
retains its moral significance in Mozi’s philosophy, Mozi has legitimatized acquisition as a 
moral activity. This radical break with the philosophical tradition is most clearly seen in the 
recognition that Mozi’s xian is Confucius’ xiaoren. Thirdly, Mozi justifies his new morality of 
acquisition as a more effectual way of solving the problems of feeding, clothing and 
sheltering from injustice the whole of mankind.  
 
Mozi’s shang xian do not contain a precise definition of his concept of xian. The only 
way to understand Mozi’s concept of xian is to study his descriptions of the practice of shang 
xian itself. Since none of the rulers practise shang xian due to their political ignorance, they 
are educated about shang xian as a method of obtaining as many xian as possible. Mozi 
teaches shang xian as a method of zhong xian using an analogy of increasing the number of 
archers and charioteers. Both archers and charioteers are familiar to rulers as men with 
abilities useful in war. Mozi’s xian, in this work, is understood as men who has abilities that 
are useful to their rulers, and rewarded for them. More importantly, these men acquired 
those useful abilities for the sake of acquiring wealth and honour for themselves. The key 
term ‘useful ability’ (能)81 is used from the point of view of reasonable rulers, and thus easily 
excludes ‘useless’ men like sycophants, rulers’ relatives, beautiful incompetents and talentless 
rich. 82  ‘能 ’ is translated as ‘useful ability’ rather than ‘ability’ to stress the ruler’s 
determination of its content. For example, if the art of archery was not considered useful to 
the ruler in war then, it would not be termed ‘能’ in the context of Mozi’s shang xian. On the 
                                                     
81 This key term ‘能’ is found in Mozi’s triad of texts, shang xian A, B and C, passim.   
82 Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p80-2; also, Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (III), p104-6.  
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other hand, assassins and thieves may be considered politically useful.83 This is not to say 
that all thieves, for example, will be considered as xian, and thus moral, but only those 
thieves who render a political service to his ruler, somewhat in the fashion of traditional 
spies, are rewarded as xian.84 In the rest of this chapter, this point will not be repeated 
because its main concerns are to outline the common psychology of acquisition upon which 
Mozi’s concept of xian rests, and to contrast this particular conception with Confucius’ 
conception of xian in order to see its novelty. The justification of this definition of Mozi’s 
xian lies in our study of Mozi’s analogy of increasing the number of archers and charioteers.  
 
There are three points of resemblance between the archer and Mozi’s xian. Firstly, 
the archer is distinguished from the non-archer by his possession of the skill of archery (能). 
Secondly, the ruler rewards the archer with wealth and honour because he needs the archer 
in war. Most importantly, the archer who was previously a non-archer acquired the art of 
archery in order to obtain wealth and honour. If the ruler can acquire as many xian as 
possible with wealth and honour, just as he can acquire as many archers as he wants in the 
same way, then it must be the case that both the archer and xian share a common 
psychology. Similarly, the ruler also can encourage more non-xian to become xian by 
punishing non-xian. In other words, Mozi’s xian was previously a non-xian who became xian 
in order to acquire for himself wealth and honour, or to avoid punishments, from his ruler. 
Part of our understanding of Mozi’s xian is that he is essentially an acquisitive being.  
 
The purpose of studying Confucius’ concept of xian is to show that Mozi’s concept 
of xian is not only new, but also opposed to that of Confucius. There are two main theses 
derived from our study of Confucius’ concept of xian. The two representatives of xian for 
Confucius are Bo Yi and Shu Qi, and their most remarkable deed was to prefer benevolence 
over the unjust acquisition of a polity. Confucius’ xian did not regret their choice, even if 
they died by starvation as a result of their preference. Mozi’s xian derive their wealth and 
                                                     
83 Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (I), p64. See Mozi’s comparison of a ruler’s practice of shang xian with 
a rich man’s trapping of a thief. If we take Mozi’s analogy seriously, it is sufficient to see that the thief 
corresponds, on the level of analogy, to Mozi’s xian.  
84 All governments, including those which claim political legitimacy on the basis of divine authority, 
have been known to employ spies; many spies in history were honoured as patriots and rewarded 
with wealth by their grateful countries.  
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honour from being useful to their ruler. It is evident that the acquisition of a polity is ranked 
among one of the great possessions a man may acquire for himself, since it offers greater 
possibilities of wealth and honour than that derived from being useful to a ruler. In the 
absence of a hereditary basis for political power, it is obvious that acquisitive beings like 
Mozi’s xian would try to acquire a polity for themselves. Thus, the first main thesis is 
Confucius’ xian is essentially an anti-acquisitive being.  
 
Confucian morality consistently opposes benevolence to self-interest which includes 
both acquisition for oneself, and self-preservation. Mozi’s conception of benevolence can be 
derived from his conversation with a man named Meng Shan, whose view of benevolence 
closely resembles Confucius’, about whether the action of a certain Prince Zi Lü is 
manifestly benevolent. The prince had chose death over unjust acquisition of a polity. Meng 
Shan considered this act to be benevolent, while Mozi thinks it is only a difficult one. Mozi 
believed that there is nothing unjust about taking over the rule of the polity as long as the 
prince is a better ruler than the previous one. It is assumed in our study of this conversation 
that Meng Shan’s view represents Confucius’ view. The comparison between Mozi’s 
conception of benevolence and that of Confucius’ throws light upon how Mozi’s 
fundamental rethinking of morality resolves this tension between benevolence and self-
interest. On Mozi’s view, benevolence no longer requires the sacrifice of self-interest. The 
second main thesis is Mozi’s very different view of benevolence, the supposedly core virtue 
of Confucius’ xian, reveals that both moralities are directly opposed. The difference between 
Mozi and Meng Shan’s views of Prince Zi Lü’s choice provides additional evidence that our 
interpretation of Mozi’s xian as Confucius’ xiaoren is a correct one.  
 
 
Mozi’s concept of xian 
 
Mozi presents the method of zhong xian in the form of analogy. This is so because, 
very plausibly, Mozi’s audience, being rulers themselves, are very familiar with the experience 
of amassing (眾) archers and charioteers, within their own guos, as opposed to the idea of 
zhong xian, or amassing xian. The teaching of shang xian remains, at this point of their political 
ignorance, for them, a pure idea without actuality. The analogy, then, has the function of 
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illustrating, or making intelligible, Mozi’s idea of shang xian to his audience of political rulers, 
taking as its starting point the point of view of political rulers. But why is it important to 
analyze this analogy? The central part of this analogy involves a fundamental resemblance 
between two methods, namely, shang xian and the method of amassing archers and 
charioteers. A close study of this analogy, therefore, tells us how shang xian works, and also, 
more importantly, how Mozi’s concept of xian resembles archers and charioteers. These two 
points of resemblance, that is to say, shang xian is analogous to the method of amassing 
archers and charioteers, and Mozi’s xian is analogous to archers and charioteers, constitute 
the heart of this analogy.  
 
This analogy has two forms which are found at the beginnings of shang xian A and C, 
but it is absent from shang xian B.85 Since the extant forms of the analogy are not identical, 
any relevant difference between them is duly discussed, either in the main text, if it is 
significant, or in the footnotes, if it does not affect the main argument. A translation of the 
analogy, found in shang xian A, forms the basis of our interpretation.  
 
If a ruler of a guo (國)86 desires (欲) to increase the number of shi (士) who 
are good archers and charioteers (善射御之士), he must (必)87 enrich (富), 
ennoble (貴), respect (敬) and praise (譽) those who are good (善)88 archers 
                                                     
85 Shang xian B does not include the analogy found in both shang xian A and C in any form; The 
function of the analogy – teach the method of zhong xian – is performed by the description of ancient 
sage kings’ action of ‘jin xian’ (進賢). See MZ 9/3-6; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p72-74.  
86 The supposition that the desire to increase the number of archers and charioteers, in the context of 
shang xian A, belongs essentially to a ruler of a guo, or more generally, Mozi’s audience (王公大人) 
can be verified by the use of the term ‘zhu hou’ (諸侯), who is also described as the ruler of his own 
guo (為政其國家) in shang xian C, in the identical context of discussing this analogy. Also, the ruler of 
a guo is assumed to possess effective monopoly over the military force.  
87 The word ‘must’ (必) is absent, in shang xian C, from the descriptions of the zhu hou’s actions. This 
word ‘必’ is essential for, in the context of shang xian A, disclosing the relationship between shang xian 
and zhong xian – shang xian is the necessary and sufficient condition for zhong xian. But the word  ‘必’ 
occurs, in shang xian C, in the descriptions of the shi’s emotional responses (joy and fear) toward the 
zhu hou’s actions. The fundamental relationship between shang xian and zhong xian therefore remains 
unmodified for both texts. The necessity here is prudence, or the dictate of reason, it is what you 
must do if you want to obtain a certain goal, which, in this case, is the increase in the number of 
archers and charioteers.  
88 The word ‘good’ (善) is substituted, in shang xian C, by the word ‘able’ (能). Although the object of 
increase (眾) is different for shang xian A and C – those who are good at shooting arrows and driving 
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and charioteers. Consequently, the good archers and charioteers, within the 
guo, can (可) be acquired (得) and increased (眾).89  
 
For our interpretation, archers and charioteers, for convenience and simplicity of 
analysis, shall be treated as equivalent, and hence, only archers, from here on, will be 
considered, leaving aside charioteers. It should be understood that whenever only archers are 
mentioned, the points made about them include also charioteers. The ruler must, according 
to Mozi, enrich, ennoble, respect and praise the good archers, within his guo, in order to 
acquire and increase the number of good archers he has. We may summarize these four 
actions of the ruler by a single word: reward. Yet a reward cannot be simply created by the 
fiat of a ruler; it must be recognized and desired as such by the men whom the ruler rewards. 
Suppose that, one day, a ruler suddenly decided to ‘reward’ men whom he found loyal and 
deserving with different quantities of refuse. This action most certainly will be perceived by 
those who are rewarded as a ‘punishment’ or a bad joke. It is, therefore, important that the 
ruler gives what his men already desire as rewards. In other words, rewards are not arbitrary 
but pertain to the desires men already have. Of course, men’s desires may be changed, but 
this objection does not change the basic point that good archers may be acquired and 
increased through rewards, however a reward may be understood, as long as both the ruler 
and his good archers share the understanding of what counts as a reward.90 Also, note that 
the four objects of reward are purely formal – the ruler enriches good archers, but it is left 
unsaid what counts as wealth, whether cowrie shells or dollar notes.  
 
Interestingly, the form of the analogy found in shang xian C has three relevant points 
of difference with the one in shang xian A. Firstly, the zhu hou (諸侯), in shang xian C, desires 
                                                                                                                                                              
chariots (shang xian A) and those who are able to shoot arrows and drive chariots (shang xian C) – the 
general principle of increase (眾) is identical. Since the distinction between a good archer and a worse 
archer is made within the smaller domain of archers, and the distinction between an archer and a 
non-archer is made within the whole domain of the ruler’s subjects, the presence of punitive 
elements must suggest that the transformation of a non-archer to an archer is more difficult than that 
of a worse archer to a good archer. But our concern is not to verify this.  
89 Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (I), p61-62; MZ 8/5-8.  
90  An excellent historical example of this point is the Roman Empire’s treatment of the Early 
Christians. The Roman authority believed, wrongly, that criminalizing and persecuting Christians 
would deter the population from embracing Christianity, and turn Christians back to the fold of 
Roman paganism. The Christians, on the contrary, saw these actual punishments as opportunities for 
martyrdom.  
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to acquire and increase the number of archers, and not just good archers. Secondly, the 
unnamed ruler’s four actions of reward are reduced to just two actions of reward by a zhu hou: 
he rewards (賞) and ennobles (貴) those with the ability (能) of archery. Thirdly, the zhu hou 
also punishes those who do not possess the ability of archery, that is to say, non-archers. 
The punishment takes the form of two actions, namely, making it a crime (罪)91, and making 
it base or ignoble (賤) to lack the ability (不能) of archery. Like rewards, punishments 
likewise must be perceived as such by both the ruler and his subjects, or else punishment will 
not achieve, in this case, its desired effect of motivating non-archers to learn archery. Hence, 
the complete method of amassing archers, in essence, consists in rewarding archers and 
punishing non-archers.  
 
Let us take a closer look at how rewarding archers and punishing non-archers, within 
any given guo, achieve the desired consequence of amassing archers. There are two primary 
ways of increasing the number of archers in any ruler’s employment. Firstly, the ruler can 
attract all existing archers who are not already in his employment, within the boundaries of 
his guo, through the use of rewards, to his employment. The chief defect of this way is that it 
is radically dependent on chance. The distribution of archers across different guos may be 
uneven, and proportionate to the size of a guo. The number of existing archers in a ruler’s guo 
may be very much smaller than that of his surrounding neighbours. So even if the ruler 
manages to attract all existing archers, in his guo, to his employment, it might be a very small 
number. The effectiveness of this way is severely limited by chance. Also, this way of 
amassing archers does not require the use of punishments. Hence, this is not, in my opinion, 
the true method of amassing archers taught by Mozi. What, then, is the true method? Let us 
recall that archery is a learned ability, that is to say, a man who lacks the ability of archery can 
acquire the ability of archery through learning. Hence, the number of archers, within any guo, 
can be increased, through the use of rewards and punishments, by making non-archers learn 
the art of archery, thereby becoming archers. Note that rewards and punishments themselves 
do not teach the art of archery itself; they only provide the motivation to learn archery. The 
                                                     
91 The word ‘criminalizing’ (罪) would appear strange at the place where it appears. One would 
expect the more appropriate word to be ‘punish’ (fa). I believe the original word罪 corresponds to 
Mozi’s exact intention of a total transformation of a guo aimed at by shang xian.  
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principle of action, then, underlying or making possible this method of amassing archers is 
the hope of reward and fear of punishment.  
 
This fundamental principle of action is fully revealed, in shang xian C, in Mozi’s 
description of how the zhu hou’s subjects responded to his new policy of rewarding archers 
and punishing non-archers. The archers are joyful (喜) as they anticipate their rewards while 
the non-archers despair (懼 ) as they anticipate their punishments. These psychological 
responses are, according to Mozi, necessarily so; this, then, is the basic psychology making 
Mozi’s method of amassing archers possible. Consequently, men strive to learn archery, not 
out of love for archery itself, but for the sake of acquiring rewards (富, 貴, 敬 and 譽) and 
avoiding punishments (罪 and 賤); archery itself is a mere means, and not an end in itself. 
Insofar as the zhu hou’s aim is to amass as many archers as possible, the increase in the 
number of archers, in his employment, through the transformation of non-archers into 
archers has the progressive effect, if the zhu hou continually rewards archers and punishes 
non-archers, of making his every single subject into an archer. In other words, at its absolute 
limit, this method is capable of making everyone, within any guo, learn archery, thus 
becoming an archer; the given size of a guo’s population, then, forms the ‘natural’ limit of the 
number of archers the ruler may amass. Archers may, of course, migrate from other guos into 
a particular guo, but this possibility can be discounted because its overall effect, when 
compared with the internal transformation of that guo, will be very small.  
 
At the beginning, we mentioned that shang xian, the method of zhong xian, is analogous 
to the method of amassing archers, and also Mozi’s xian is analogous to an archer. The first 
analogy presupposes the second; in other words, for shang xian to work like the method of 
amassing archers, Mozi’s xian must be relevantly like an archer. Hence, to clarify to ourselves 
Mozi’s concept of xian, let us first think about the key features of an archer. From the 
perspective of a ruler, an archer is a man with a specific ability (能) that is useful in a 
particular context – war; he needs as many archers as possible in war, hence the problem of 
amassing archers. Yet the art of archery is not innate, it is acquired by learning; this simple 
fact implies that all archers were once non-archers, that is to say, men become archers by 
learning the art of archery. The problem of amassing archers, then, can be reduced to the 
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problem of motivating men to learn archery, and the answer to this problem lies in the use 
of rewards and punishments: men become archers out of the hope for rewards and fear of 
punishments. The basic psychological postulate underlying the effectiveness of this answer, 
therefore, is all men desire self-gain, or all men acquire for themselves. The negative 
characterization of this is men’s desire to avoid punishment: the absence of pain can be 
construed as a gain. Reasoning by analogy, we can reasonably conclude that this postulate is 
also the fundamental ground of Mozi’s shang xian. It follows, then, that Mozi’s xian, like an 
archer, is a man who becomes xian in order to acquire rewards and avoid punishments for 
himself. This, in fact, constitutes the essence of ‘shang’ of Mozi’s shang xian: the xian are 
rewarded while the non-xian are punished. The motivation to become xian, unlike for 
Confucius’ conception of xian, is not a moral one. Furthermore, since a guo constitutes a 
closed system of rewards and punishments, excluding any movement of people into and out 
of it,92 it is necessary that the rewards, for example, wealth, be finite. Hence, if a man is 
enriched by his ruler, he is, of necessity, made richer than other men, within the same guo, 
since wealth is a relative notion, and the others are, by comparison, made poorer, relative to 
this man. In short, all men, then, within the same guo, are competing with each other for the 
same end: wealth. Given that wealth is one of the rewards for being a xian, the result is men 
compete with each other to become xian. This competition to become xian is directly 
derived from the universal and visible rewarding of xian, and punishing of non-xian.93  
 
More importantly, the other implication of the basic psychological postulate 
underlying Mozi’s shang xian is a novel account of the existence of different human types 
                                                     
92  To simplify matters, it is supposed that a guo constitutes a closed system of rewards and 
punishments, excluding any movement of people into and out of it. This supposition is only 
methodological, and not ontological. It is conceivable that people from other guos may be attracted to 
a guo that practices shang xian by the rewards. The reason for adopting this supposition is to make 
clear the point that once shang xian is introduced, men must ceaselessly compete with each other to 
become and being xian because being xian is not a permanent condition; it is subjected to the actions 
of others. If others outperform you, then you are no longer xian.  
93 MZ 8/14; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (I), p64 “... upon hearing this, all competed in doing 
righteousness.” MZ 9/5; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (II), p72 “Thereupon people were all 
encourage by rewards and threatened by punishments and strove with each other after virtue.” MZ 
10/8; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (III), p96 “Therefore the state and the people are to be governed 
by exalting the virtuous, so that those in the state that do good will be encourage and those that do 
evil will be obstructed.”.  
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such as men who are moral, good orators, erudite and others.94 These differences are no 
longer, on Mozi’s account, understood as a difference of ends, but one of means of 
acquisition. Notably, morality now decisively resembles an acquired ability (能) like archery 
itself. Mozi’s advice to a ruler to use shang xian as a method to amass loyal and faithful men 
around him is the best proof of this conceptual change. Just as non-archers acquire archery 
in hope of reward and out of fear of punishment, men become loyal and faithful for the 
same reasons. Morality, then, on Mozi’s account, loses its status as a distinct end, and 
becomes one mode, among many, of acquisition. Again, archery is a specific ability, and it is 
acquired in hope of rewards and out of fear of punishments. Mozi’s xian, on the other hand, 
is a general term designating any man with any ability that is useful to the ruler; recall that 
Mozi’s shang xian is a remedy for the rulers’ political problems. To arrive at his own novel 
concept of xian, Mozi first reduces the different human types to humans with different types 
of abilities, and then grounds the acquisition of all these abilities on the fundamental desire 
of all men for acquisition. In other words, Mozi explains the variability of human types or 
abilities as different modes of satisfying the single invariant human desire for acquisition. 
Mozi’s concept of xian appears, at first glance, to many commentators as a specific type of 
man or a man with a specific ability like an archer; so, on first impression, we might be 
misled into understanding Mozi’s advice as akin to the commonsense advice to get a 
plumber to fix the pipes if you cannot do it yourself. But on closer inspection, his concept of 
xian is indeed novel because it is a general concept designating any man with any ability 
useful to the ruler, and from this, we can finally clarify Mozi’s shang xian as a general method 
for acquiring any man with any ability that the ruler himself believes to be useful95, simply by 




                                                     
94 MZ 8/6-8; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (I), p62 “ ... the virtuous and the excellent who are firm in 
morality, versed in rhetoric, and experienced in statecraft – since these are the treasures of the nation 
and props of the state.” See also MZ 10/6-7; Mei, Exaltation of the Virtuous (III), p96 where the 
method of amassing archers and charioteers is also used to amass those who are loyal and faithful.  
95 If Mozi’s shang xian is truly a general method, then the method of amassing archers must be a 
particular instantiation of this general method that is applied to the acquisition of archers; the 
relationship between two methods can no longer be understood as two parallel methods of acquiring 
two different kinds of men, namely archers and Mozi’s xian.  
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Confucius’ concept of xian: an interpretation of Analects 7/15 
 
The task of this section lies in clarifying to ourselves Confucius’ concept of xian in 
order to see better the novelty of Mozi’s concept of xian. Analects 7/15 consists of two 
dialogues: the first is between Ran You and Zi Gong, both students of Confucius, and the 
second between Zi Gong and Confucius. The first dialogue takes place, from its pragmatic 
context, outside Confucius’ room, and is divided into two distinct parts, separated by the 
second dialogue, where the first part consists of Ran You’s question and Zi Gong’s decision 
to ask Confucius, while the second part consists of Zi Gong’s answer to Ran You’s original 
question. The second dialogue, on the other hand, takes place, again from the pragmatic 
context, inside Confucius’ room. The standard D.C. Lau translation of the text has been 
revised to render the proper names in Hanyu Pinyin rather than Wades-Giles. Nothing else 
has been changed.  
 
Analects 7/15  
Ran You said, “Is the Master on the side of the Lord of Wei?”  
Zi Gong said, “Well, I shall put the question to him.”  
He went in and said, “What sort of men were Bo Yi and Shu Qi?”  
“They were excellent men [賢人] of old.”  
“Did they have any complaints?”  
“They sought benevolence [仁] and got it [仁]. So why should they have 
any complaints?”  
When Zi Gong came out, he said, “The Master is not on his side.”96  
 
The leading question of this text is Ran You’s question: “Is the master on the side of 
the Lord of Wei?”, and the whole movement of the text lies in arriving at an answer to this 
question. Yet this question is not identical with our question – what is Confucius’ concept of 
xian? What is in question here, for Ran You, is Confucius’ opinion of a particular political 
man, the Lord of Wei, while the question, for us, is Confucius’ opinion of a particular type 
of man, the xian. Since the answer to Ran You’s question necessarily depends on Confucius’ 
                                                     
96 Lau, Analects, 7/15, p 59-61.  
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notion of xian, the only way to understand Confucius’ concept of xian is by an interpretation 
of the entire text, Analects 7/15, starting with Ran You’s question.  
 
The text begins with Ran You’s question, and the very fact that Ran You poses this 
question implies that for Ran You, it is unclear what Confucius’ opinion truly is, that is to 
say, the possibility of Confucius being on the side of the Lord of Wei exists. Among 
Confucius’ students, Ran You is a good politician and Zi Gong is a good speaker.97 Before 
we can clarify to ourselves the meaning of Ran You’s question, we must first learn why Ran 
You did not pose his question directly to Confucius himself instead of trying to learn about 
Confucius’ opinion from Zi Gong. To do so, the political context of Ran You’s question has 
to be taken into consideration. The Lord of Wei mentioned in Ran You’s question is named 
Zhe, and he is the grandson of the previous ruler of Wei, Duke Ling. Zhe’s father, the 
Crown Prince Guai Gui, after a failed attempt to murder Duke Ling’s notorious wife Nan Zi, 
was exiled by Duke Ling. Before he passed away, Duke Ling made Zhe the Lord of Wei. 
Now, with the help of an army from Jin98, Guai Gui established himself in a city of Wei, 
named Qin. Guai Gui commands Zhe to abdicate in favour of him, and Zhe refused on the 
ground that his abdication would be a transgression of the previous ruler’s command. The 
political context of Ran You’s question therefore is the fight between Guai Gui and Zhe, 
father and son, over the rule of Wei, and Ran You’s question can be elaborated, in the light 
of the political context, as: “Does the master approve of Zhe’s refusal to abdicate in favour 
of his own father?” In other words, Ran You is asking for Confucius’ judgement of Zhe’s 
political action. Given that both dialogues of Analects 7/15 take place in Wei, under the 
political power of Zhe, it would be prudent to exercise caution. Since Ran You did not pose 
his question to Confucius directly, but to Zi Gong, it is highly plausible that Ran You wanted 
Zi Gong to pose the question to Confucius in a manner that would not implicate any of 
them in speaking ill of the Lord of Wei, Zhe, especially when Wei is facing an imminent civil 
war. The fact that Zi Gong did not merely repeat Ran You’s question to Confucius supports 
this way of reading the opening of Analects 7/15.  
 
                                                     
97 Lau, Analects 11/3, p97. See also Lau, appendix 2, p249-253, for his more extensive comments on 
these two students of Confucius.  
98 The small state of Wei lies on the southeast border of its large neighbour Jin.  
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A closer look at Zhe’s political situation is required to make sense of what is truly at 
stake here. Zhe’s right to be the Lord of Wei derives from the command of the previous 
ruler, Duke Ling, and he now rules on the ground of obeying the command of his ruler who 
is also his grandfather. Zhe’s father Guai Gui’s right to rule over Wei derives from the fact 
that he is the crown prince, and the principle of primogeniture dictates that he should rule 
instead of Zhe. What are the political choices facing Zhe? If Zhe obeys his grandfather, that 
is to say, the previous ruler, he should remain the Lord of Wei; on the other hand, if Zhe 
obeys his father, he should abdicate in favour of his father. The same dilemma confronts 
Guai Gui. If Guai Gui were to obey his own father, now dead, he would not fight Zhe for 
the rule of Wei, since his own father passed the rule of Wei to Zhe. But Guai Gui chose to 
insist on the right of primogeniture, and disobey his father, thereby contesting with Zhe for 
the rule of Wei. The problem here is not who has the right to rule Wei, since both Zhe and 
Guai Gui both possess the right to rule Wei, although their rights to rule are grounded 
differently, nor is it a problem of determining whose right is stronger. In other words, what 
is in question here is not whether Zhe is on the right side in politics. In the normal state of 
affairs, both rights exactly coincide because the successor will succeed to rule on the basis of 
both primogeniture and the command of the previous ruler. The political anomaly here is 
Zhe, the son, is now the ruler of his own father, Guai Gui.  
 
To learn from Confucius the answer to Ran You’s question, Zi Gong did not repeat 
the question to Confucius, but he asked two different questions, and on the basis of 
Confucius’ answers to them, he answered Ran You’s original question. Hence, Zi Gong’s 
two questions presumably are equivalent to Ran You’s original question, and Confucius’ two 
answers are also presumably equivalent to Zi Gong’s final answer to Ran You. Supposing 
the dialogue between Confucius and Zi Gong is, for whatever reasons, absent, and what 
remains is the first dialogue, we would still know that Confucius is not on the side of the 
Lord of Wei, but we would not know the grounds of Confucius’ answer. In other words, the 
second dialogue not only contains Confucius’ answer to Ran You’s original question, but 
also the reasons for his answer.  
 
Zi Gong’s first question to Confucius introduces two individuals Bo Yi and Shu Qi, 
and it is an inquiry into Confucius’ opinion of them. At this point of Analects 7/15, 
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Confucius himself introduces the notion of xian by his answer that Bo Yi and Shu Qi are 
xian of antiquity. To make sense of this pair of question and answer, we first need to learn 
more about Bo Yi and Shu Qi. In antiquity, both Bo Yi and Shu Qi, who are brothers, are 
members of the ruling family of a guo named Ku Chu. Bo Yi is the eldest brother while Shu 
Qi is the third and youngest brother. Between them, there is a second brother. The father of 
both brothers, before he passed away, passed the rule of Ku Chu to Shu Qi. After the death 
of the father, Shu Qi ceded the rule of Ku Chu to Bo Yi because of his respect for his eldest 
brother. On the other hand, Bo Yi refused to accept the rule of Ku Chu because his father 
had decided Shu Qi should rule. Bo Yi has the right to rule Ku Chu on the basis of 
primogeniture, and Shu Qi has the right to rule Ku Chu on the basis of his father’s 
command. But both exiled themselves from Ku Chu, and the people of Ku Chu chose the 
second brother to rule them.  
 
The political situation of Bo Yi and Shu Qi is relevantly similar to the political 
situation of Guai Gui and Zhe: both involve a contest between two family members over a 
guo and both members possess an equal right to the guo on different grounds. Given that xian 
is a term of distinction and praise, Confucius’ recognition of Bo Yi and Shu Qi as xian of 
antiquity implies that they function as a standard against which Guai Gui and Zhe are judged. 
The most significant difference between these two political situations is this: Bo Yi and Shu 
Qi both gave up their claim to Ku Chu while Guai Gui and Zhe both insist on their claim to 
Wei. The action of Bo Yi and Shu Qi can be described as ceding the guo to the other (rang guo) 
while the action of Guai Gui and Zhe can be described as fighting over the guo (zheng guo). 
Both Bo Yi and Shu Qi ceded the guo, Ku Chu, to the other not because neither has a right 
to it, but because of the other’s right to it. Both recognize the priority of the other and his 
right to what one also has a right to. In contrast, both Guai Gui and Zhe are fighting over 
the guo of Wei because they refuse to recognize the priority of the other. At this point of our 
inquiry, we may say that Confucius is not on the side of the Lord of Wei because Zhe should 
have ceded his place to his father (rang guo) rather than fight with his father over the rule of 
Wei (zheng guo).  
 
Zi Gong’s second question alludes to the deaths of Bo Yi and Shu Qi, after they 
yielded their right over the polity of Ku Chu. They were starved to death. Zi Gong wanted 
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to learn whether they had any regrets (怨) over how their lives ended. Bo Yi and Shu Qi 
both desired to embody benevolence, and sought to express that virtue of benevolence by 
yielding to whom they believe to be superior. Their original problem involves a tension 
between what they considered to be right and their own self-interest, that is, the political rule 
of Ku Chu. Each of them, however, chose to resolve it in favour of what they considered to 
be right. If Bo Yi and Shu Qi had regrets before their deaths, it would clearly imply that they 
later judged that their solution was wrong. Given another chance, they would perhaps have 
chosen otherwise. Confucius’ reply was negative, and thus Bo Yi and Shu Qi would not have, 
in spite of their unfortunate ends, changed their original decision. In other words, their 
judgement of whether their decision was a correct one is independent of the consequences 
of that decision.  
 
 From our interpretation of Analects 7/15, the crucial difference between Bo Yi and 
Shu Qi whom Confucius regarded as xian, and Guai Gui and Zhe is simply their opposed 
decisions in relevantly similar choice situations. Given an opposition between morality and 
self-interest, the first pair of xian would always resolve it in favour of morality while the 
latter pair would resolve it in favour of self-interest. Bo Yi and Shu Qi gave up their right 
over Ku Chu for the sake of the virtue of benevolence; Guai Gui and Zhe are preparing to 
go to war for the sake of ruling the state of Wei. More specifically, Confucius’ xian would 
not have allowed the desire to acquire a polity, either Ku Chu or Wei, to guide their 
decisions.  
 
 More importantly, the family played a dominant role in Bo Yi and Shu Qi’s decisions. 
Bo Yi decided to yield, in spite of his right over Ku Chu on the basis of primogeniture, to 
Shu Qi because their father had chose the latter as his successor. He regarded his familial 
relationship with his father as more important than the abstract principle of primogeniture. 
Similarly, Shu Qi defied their father’s decision because Bo Yi was his eldest brother. Since 
their father was dead, he regarded his fraternal relationship to Bo Yi as the more important 
consideration. In contrast, both Guai Gui and Zhe behaved as if they did not recognize each 
other as members of the same family. From the viewpoint of Confucius, Guai Gui and Zhe 
are not considered as xian because they are willing to kill each other in order to acquire the 
state of Wei, despite their familial relationship. From Mozi’s perspective, they would not be 
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necessarily condemned as non-xian, in spite of their acquisitiveness, because he would have 
judged them on the basis of the consequences of their rule rather than the acquisition of the 
state itself. We may say that Confucius viewed xian as primarily non-acquisitive men while 




Mozi’s notion of benevolence (仁) 
 
We have already clarified to ourselves Mozi’s and Confucius’ concepts of xian, and in 
order to prove that these two concepts greatly differ in content, in the sense of being directly 
opposed to each other, we must first remind ourselves of what, according to Confucius, 
constitutes the core of being xian: it is a way of life defined by the striving for benevolence, 
or ren (仁). Two men who had lived such lives, and acquired ren, are Bo Yi and Shu Qi. The 
notion of ren, then, lies at the center of Confucius’ concept of xian. The task of showing that 
contents of Mozi’s and Confucius’ concepts of xian contradict each other, consequently, 
becomes one of contrasting Confucius’ notion of ren with Mozi’s notion of ren in order to 
exhibit more clearly our basic thesis that Mozi introduces, in his teaching of shang xian, a new 
concept of xian.  
 
Mozi once had a conversation with Meng Shan whose views of benevolence is very 
similar to that of Confucius. He only appears once in all five books of Mozi’s dialogues.99 
Mozi disagreed with Meng Shan’s praise of a particular prince as benevolent, and argued that 
he had confused what was difficult to accomplish with what is truly benevolent. Mozi then 
discussed what he considered to be truly benevolent. The close reading of this interesting 
dialogue would reveal the fundamental differences between Mozi and Confucius’ views of 
xian.  
 
At the opening of the dialogue, Meng Shan praised a prince of the state of Chu 
named Zi Lü as benevolent. During the past revolt of Bai Gong, Prince Zi Lü was held 
                                                     
99 See MZ 49/76-81; Mei, Lü Wen, p506-8.  
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hostage by the rebel. Bai Gong then threatened the prince with death to compel the latter to 
accept the sovereignty of Chu. The rebel had hoped that the prince would legitimatize his 
rebellion by accepting the rule of Chu; he had gambled on the assumption that most men 
have ambitions for political rule, and they would also want to live more than die.100 It was 
impossible for the prince to refuse Bai Gong’s offer and survive the dilemma with his life. 
Bai Gong had calculated that most men would choose political rule and life, and hoped that 
the prince would behave like them. He had not considered the possibility of a man dying for 
the sake of yi.  
 
Yet Prince Zi Lü refused Bai Gong’s offer because he believed that accepting the 
sovereignty of Chu in such a situation is equivalent to committing an act of injustice (不義). 
He further revealed his commitment to justice by adding that he would refuse the gift of the 
universal empire, if accepting it is unjust. In other words, the prince chose death over life for 
the sake of justice. Other than the fact that a rebellion is usually perceived as unjust by the 
Chinese worldview, the injustice of accepting the sovereignty of Chu from Bai Gong seems 
to lie in the suggestion that Bai Gong had murdered the prince’s parents. The prince also felt 
insulted by Bai Gong’s offer because he interprets the offer as a bribe to forget the unjust 
murder of his parents. Following the prince’s reasoning closely, it is evident that the prince 
separated the question of whether a decision was right from the consequences of that 
decision. The fact that some consequences of a decision might be contrary to his self-interest 
does not affect his judgement whther that decision was right or wrong. Unlike Bai Gong, he 
did not consider whether his refusal would lead to his death; he merely thought about the 
justice of his acceptance. Like Confucius’ xian, the prince has chosen to resolve the tension 
between morality and self-interest in favour of the former. Meng Shan’s unsolicited praise of 
Prince Zi Lü clearly reveals his basic agreement with Confucius.  
 
Mozi disagreed with Meng Shan. He considered the prince’s refusal as a difficult act, 
but it does not qualify as a benevolent one, from his point of view. This disagreement 
between Mozi and Meng Shan can be regarded as a proxy for the differences between Mozi 
                                                     
100 See MZ 47/1-3; Mei, Esteem for Righteousness, p444. Mozi observes that some men cherish yi more 
than their own lives, and are willing to die for yi. This observation is not inconsistent with the view 
that most men hold self-preservation to be a very important end.  
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and Confucius’ interpretations of the virtue of benevolence, since Meng Shan’s view is 
clearly Confucian. Mozi introduced the new consideration of whether Bai Gong’s revolt can 
be justified by the previous ruler’s injustice as the means to reverse Meng Shan’s judgement 
of Prince Zi Lü’s action as benevolent. Meng Shan would have, I think, thought this 
consideration as irrelevant because one cannot justify one’s injustice by others’ injustices.  
 
From Mozi’s point of view, the prince’s judgement of the original ruler of Chu 
should play a role in his decision. If the previous ruler had been unjust, Bai Gong’s revolt 
would be justified on the ground that it replaced an unjust situation with a better one, 
although Bai Gong might not have created a situation of perfect justice. Furthermore, the 
prince should accept the sovereignty of Chu if he believes that he can rule better than the 
deposed ruler. If the previous ruler was just, then Bai Gong’s revolt cannot be justified on 
the ground of justice. The prince, however, should still accept the sovereignty of Chu 
because he can only punish Bai Gong for his criminal revolt, if he possesses absolute power 
in Chu, and after which he can return the sovereignty of Chu back to its original ruler. Mozi 
thinks purely in terms of outcomes rather than the relationships between the involved 
participants. Prince Zi Lü then should make the same decision of becoming the ruler of Chu, 
although for different reasons, depending on the justice of Bai Gong’s revolt.  
 
Why had Mozi considered Prince Zi Lü’s actual choice of refusing the sovereignty of 
Chu as only a difficult act? The fact that the prince sacrificed his life for the sake of justice 
did not impress Mozi. That most men would choose political rule and life over death, when 
they find themselves in Prince Zi Lü’s dilemma, only proves that the prince performed what 
most men are unwilling and unable to do.101 From Mozi’s point of view, the death of prince 
did not contribute to making the situation more just. If Bai Gong’s revolt was justified, then 
the prince’s death only prevents Chu from emerging from a state of anarchy, since Bai Gong 
cannot legitimatize his revolt on his own. If the latter could do so on his own, he would not 
have threaten the prince with death to force an outcome favourable to himself. If Bai 
Gong’s revolt was unjustified, then the prince’s death left Bai Gong unpunished for his 
crimes. Prince Zi Lü’s death would result in more injustice than his acceptance of Bai 
Gong’s offer.  
                                                     
101 See MZ 47/1-3; Mei, Esteem for Righteousness, p444, first paragraph.  
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Confronted with the same moral dilemma, Mozi and Meng Shan chose opposed 
solutions, where the former wanted the prince to accept Bai Gong’s offer while the latter 
wanted the prince to refuse Bai Gong’s offer. Given that Mozi would have praised the 
prince’s acceptance as an act of benevolence, this disagreement clearly reveals that Mozi and 
Confucius hold different concepts of benevolence. It is assumed that both Confucius and 
Meng Shan share the same concept of benevolence. What was considered as unjust by Meng 
Shan viz. accepting Bai Gong’s offer of ruling Chu becomes Mozi’s effective means of 
achieving justice through benefitting Chu. Moreover, the prince’s decision to accept Bai 
Gong’s offer entails his own survival. The tension between morality and self-interest which 
in this case meant self-preservation and political ambition vanishes in Mozi’s solution, where 
morality no longer opposes the fulfilment of self-interest. For Mozi, it is now in one’s self-
interest to be moral viz. the prince can only perserve his own life by accepting Bai Gong’s 
offer which in turn is a means to the just end of either a better regime for Chu or punishing 





Mozi’s use of the word ‘xian’ in his triad of shang xian might lead us to conclude that 
his concept of xian does not differ very much from Confucius’ concept, since both thinkers 
had used the same term in their philosophies. Both philosophers’ concepts of xian, however, 
contradict each other.102 The purpose of disguising the novelty of a particular concept under 
a traditional philosophical term may be to ease its acceptance by an audience with prejudices 
in favour of the traditional. Of course, this move assumes that Mozi’s choice of the term 
‘xian’ is deliberate and his concept of xian is truly novel. In this chapter, it has been shown 
that Mozi’s concept of xian is directly opposed to that of Confucius, where the latter 
conceives of xian as men who always prefers morality over their own self-interests if ever 
both were to conflict. The main objectives of this section are two, that is, to show that 
                                                     
102 See Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p34 for his textual observation: ‘Although the moral terminology 
of Mohism has much in common with Confucianism one pair of Confucian terms is notable for its 
absence, the ‘gentleman’ and his opposite the ‘vulgar man’. Graham, together with Schwartz, makes 
this textual observation, but they do not explain this absence. 
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Mozi’s xian are the same kind of men as Confucius’ xiaoren and also that Mozi’s motivation 
for introducing a new concept of xian is to solve the problems of universal hunger, clothing 
all of mankind and protecting the weak from injustices.  
 
Confucius’ junzi and xiaoren are not socio-economic categories, but moral ones. 
Suppose that there are two men A and B. A devotes his entire life to the pursuit of 
benevolence (仁), that is to say, to moral perfection, and he awaits, according to Confucius, 
recognition from a ruler who will then employ him in government. Once in a position of 
political power, A will work to benefit the guo. We know that the status of being xian, in the 
understanding of Confucius, is independent of any political ruler; in other words, A is 
already xian, if he seeks and attains benevolence, before he is recognized as such by any ruler. 
A is passive with respect to political power because he will not assert himself in order to 
acquire political power. Instead his recognition by others, especially political rulers, is 
essential to his possession of political power. Also, the very recognition of A as a xian by the 
ruler implies that the ruler himself thinks of benevolence as a desirable end.  
 
B primarily seeks wealth and honour to the extent that there is no difference, from a 
“behaviourist” perspective, between him and a genuinely moral man. He would behave 
morally as part of his strategy to acquire more wealth and honour, somewhat in the fashion 
of a man who abides by the laws out of fear of punishment. Such a man is capable of 
becoming a xian, as Mozi understands the term, in a polity where his shang xian is practiced. 
When a ruler adopts shang xian as a policy, and rewards xian and punishes non-xian 
accordingly, men like B would strive to become xian for the hope of gaining wealth and 
honour and out of the fear of punishments. The crucial difference between A and B is their 
motivation with respect to becoming xian.  
 
Observe that A’s becoming xian, unlike B, is not dependent on there being a public 
institution of shang xian, in Mozi’s sense, because A is not interested in the acquisition of 
wealth and honour as such. B will also work very hard, under the employment of his ruler, to 
benefit his polity. From the point of view of results, there is no essential difference between 
A and B since both work very hard to benefit the polity, and if benefits to the polity are 
decisive, then it does not matter that the motives of A and B are different.  
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Yet to assert the primacy of the “behaviourist” point of view, that is to say, 
calculating the consequences of action, and neglecting to take intentions into account, is to 
choose to be blind to the fact that A and B pursue two distinct ends: benevolence and 
individual profit. The action of benefiting a guo, identical from the “behaviourist” point of 
view, must be understood in light of their ends. Firstly, A’s benefaction of a guo is an 
expression of his benevolence, and not the result of any other motive. Hence, if A is no 
longer rewarded with wealth and honour, for whatever reasons, he will still continue to 
benefit the guo. Wealth and honour are accidental to his identity as xian, in Confucius’ sense, 
and the defining characteristic of Confucius’ xian is to place benevolence as an end higher 
than all other ends, including self-preservation. This was most clearly seen, in the examples 
of Bo Yi and Shu Qi, together with Prince Zi Lü, where benevolence is always chosen over 
self-preservation. On the other hand, B understands being xian, in Mozi’s sense, as merely a 
means of attaining his true end of acquiring wealth and honour; if the ruler fails to reward 
him with wealth and honour, despite his fulfillment of the criteria of xian, B will lose his 
motivation for being xian and cease to benefit the guo. In other words, his benefaction of the 
guo depends on the satisfaction of his desire for self-gain. The fundamental point here is not 
to prove that Mozi’s xian and Confucius’ xian have two distinct ends, a fact already known to 
us from our analysis of these concepts and their different contents, but to exhibit the 
remarkable conclusion that Mozi’s xian is, in fact, Confucius’ xiao ren. How is this so? 
Confucius remarked, in the Analects, that the junzi embraces justice (yi) while the xiaoren 
embraces profit (li). 103  In addition, he also observes that the junzi constantly thinks of 
benevolence (仁) while the xiaoren, in contrast, constantly calculates profit (li). It is obvious, 
from these two remarks of Confucius, that the fundamental distinction between junzi and 
xiaoren is one of ends, and the junzi’s end is benevolence while the xiaoren’s end is profit. 
Hence, Mozi’s xian is, in truth, Confucius’ xiaoren. And more importantly, another reason 
why Mozi used the same word ‘xian’ to refer to a novel concept of xian, other than to 
disguise his conceptual innovation, is to eliminate benevolence as a distinct end for human 
life because one no longer thinks of becoming xian as becoming benevolent; one ‘forgets’ 
                                                     
103 See Lau, Analects, 4/16, p32.  
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benevolence. The move, of course, relies on the premise that most men prefer to be known 
as xian, whatever its content, than non-xian, or worse, not xian.  
 
The fundamental disagreement between Confucius and Mozi, then, is normative, and 
not factual because B exists as a human type in both moralities: he is Confucius’ xiaoren and 
Mozi’s xian. Also, Confucius teaches as clearly as Mozi that all men desire wealth and 
honour. This change in moral evaluation of the human type represented by B is, in essence, 
the absolute reversal of values effected by Mozi’s teaching of shang xian. We know that, from 
our analysis of Mozi’s concept of xian, Mozi reduced the heterogeneity of human types to 
the heterogeneity of what they aim to acquire, thereby revealing the fundamental 
homogeneity of human beings, implies that there is only one type of human being, and he is 
only interested in acquisition, that is to say, profiting himself; in other words, Mozi’s novel 
concept of xian rests on the postulate that almost all men desire wealth and honour for 
themselves, and the xian are men who acquired better than others. The members of a guo, 
where Mozi’s shang xian is practiced, effectively compete against each other in order to 
acquire wealth and honour, and since they possess the same end of acquisition, Mozi’s 
distinction between xian and not xian, then, applies to the domain of Confucius’ xiaoren. 
Already, in our analysis of Mozi’s concept of xian, we have proved to ourselves that the ruler 
practices shang xian in order to acquire for himself too; hence, Mozi’s xian is actually a xiaoren, 
from Confucius’ point of view, who is successful at acquisition. To summarize: A is xian, 
from the perspective of ends, because his end is benevolence while B is xian, from the 
perspective of means, because he acquires well.  
 
The life of a Confucian junzi who devotes his entire life to the pursuit of 
benevolence, or his own moral perfection, is not completely self-sufficient; he depends on 
others to provide him with food, clothing, and protection from injustice. Hence, the very 
possibility of a Confucian junzi necessarily presupposes the existence of the division of 
labour. Since the Confucian junzi is not a farmer, and man obtains his food from farming, a 
society in which the Confucian junzi exists is one where there are at least two basic human 
types: the Confucian junzi and the farmer. There are, of course, many other human types that 
are needed because both the Confucian junzi and the farmer need clothes, protection from 
injustice, and other things. We restrict ourselves to the consideration of these two types for 
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the sake of simplicity. For Confucius, the distinction between junzi and xiaoren is 
fundamental, and here, it is clear that the farmer belongs to the moral category of xiaoren 
since he is only concerned with his own gain. This is a reasonable assumption because even 
if the endpoint of Confucius’ fundamental project is a whole society of junzi, his starting 
point must be a society with both junzi and xiaoren. The relation of the Confucian junzi to the 
xiaoren, or that of the junzi to the farmer, is one of dependence because the junzi cannot 
strive for benevolence without the prior existence of the farmer who both labours for 
himself and the junzi. Yet this relation is problematic in terms of justice. Confucius’ 
fundamental project is the education of a few junzi who, then, form a moral aristocracy that 
rules over the many xiaoren, and this is his solution to the political problem of regime, that is 
to say, what kind of men should rule? Given that the end of junzi is benevolence, and that of 
xiaoren is profit, the moral aristocracy of junzi implies that benevolence is ranked as a higher 
end than profit; the highest end of a society ruled by junzi is benevolence. Consequently, the 
purpose of the division of labour that is a necessary, not sufficient, condition for the 
existence of the moral aristocracy of junzi seems to be the actualization of benevolence. It is 
precisely on this point that Mozi attacks Confucius.  
 
The original condition of man, according to Mozi, is a defective one; man, unlike 
animals, must labour in order to provide himself with food and clothing. In short, man can 
only preserve himself through his own labour. Since a man himself cannot be both a farmer 
and a weaver because he might not excel at both, there is a need for division of labour. The 
simplest case involves two men where one is a farmer and the other a weaver, and they 
exchange the surplus of their production with each other, thereby providing each other with 
food and clothing. Man’s elemental needs – the desire for food and the desire for shelter 
from the cold – are satisfied by the division of labour, or in Mozi’s terms, the sharing of 
labour. This exchange of the products of one’s labour, that is, food and clothing, is just (義) 
because both satisfy, through this exchange, their elemental needs; they preserve themselves 
through the sharing of labour. No one would disagree, I believe, that hunger is an urgent 
necessity, and also that any way of life, including that of the Confucian junzi, presupposes 
mere life. In other words, the man who devotes his life to the pursuit of his own moral 
perfection must have already satisfied his own elemental needs. But he could not have done 
so himself because he is neither a farmer nor a weaver. This must have appeared, from 
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Mozi’s point of view, to be unjust (不義) because the Confucian junzi consumes the surplus 
of the farmer’s and weaver’s labour without giving them anything in return. Since Confucius’ 
ideal regime is a moral aristocracy of junzi, and the highest end of this regime is the striving 
for benevolence, what is in question here is the justice of this regime. The genesis of the 
division of labour, on Mozi’s account, has its roots in a just (義) satisfaction of man’s 
elemental needs. The division of labour is the condition for a moral aristocracy of junzi, but 
the moral aristocracy of junzi is not its raison d'etre. By inquiring into the origin of the division 
of labour for human beings, Mozi raises the question whether the relation of junzi to xiaoren 
is not an unjust relation of master and slave where the slave, in this case, the xiaoren, labours 
to feed both himself and the master while the master enjoys a life of leisure for the pursuit of 
benevolence.  
 
Confucius could reply that the moral aristocracy of junzi does not simply exist for the 
good of junzi themselves, but the good of the whole which includes the xiaoren. The 
subsequent development of Confucian thought follows this line of argumentation. In other 
words, the good of the whole, then, is interpreted by Confucius to be the striving for 
benevolence: it must also be the good of xiaoren who do not and cannot strive for 
benevolence to live under a moral aristocracy of junzi. The fundamental problem for 
Confucius, in the Analects, is the education of the junzi, or the actualization of the moral 
aristocracy of junzi. Yet the junzi who strives for benevolence shares with the xiaoren the 
elemental desire for food; both will get hungry. The junzi might need very little food for his 
subsistence; nonetheless he still needs food. Hence, the problem of universal hunger, from 
the point of view of Mozi, is more fundamental than the problem of educating the junzi. The 
moral aristocracy of junzi, then, must also be a solution to this problem of universal hunger 
because Confucius does not deny self-preservation as an end for all men; he only questions it 
as the highest end of man. Mozi may agree with Confucius that the problem of universal 
hunger, under the moral aristocracy of junzi, is solved, but he points out that the 
actualization of this moral aristocracy is highly improbable. How is this so? The rule of a 
benevolent aristocracy depends on the successful education of some junzi, but Confucius’ 
attempt, in the Analects, proves that even the education of one junzi is immensely difficult. 
Confucius’ best student Yan Hui, the only student whom he praised as xian, was the only 
student closest to being a junzi, or even a xian, but he died tragically young. Even if 
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Confucius succeeded in educating some junzi, they would still need to be recognized by 
rulers who themselves are not benevolent in order to actualize the rule of benevolence. 
Mozi’s objection, then, is Confucius’ project is radically dependent on chance. Since 
Confucius’ solution is highly unlikely to be actualized, the problem of universal hunger 
remains unsolved while Confucius spends his time educating junzi. In concrete terms, men 
are dying of hunger while junzi are being educated. In short, the subordination of profit to 
benevolence as an end completely fails to solve man’s elemental needs.  
 
The urgency of universal hunger compels Mozi to seek another solution. Since 
Mozi’s goal of actualizing yi is aimed at overcoming the problem of universal hunger, and 
shang xian is part of Mozi’s teaching which is a means to this final end, we may surmise that 
Mozi’s novel concept of xian is a solution to the problem of universal hunger. Men, under 
Mozi’s order of things, compete with each other to become xian for the sake of acquiring 
wealth and honour. Mozi’s xian are men who prove themselves to be more useful than 
others to their rulers; yet while doing so, these men satisfy their own desire for acquisition, 
and thereby indirectly make it possible for others to satisfy their elemental needs within their 
own guos. Men, then, are compelled by Mozi’s order of things, that is to say, the practice of 
shang xian, to share their labour with others because that is the only way by which they can 
gratify their own desire for acquisition. The regime of Mozi’s xian is founded on the pursuit 
of gain: its highest and only end is individual gain, or acquisition; it is no longer divided into 
two distinct ends like Confucius’ regime where the junzi’s end is benevolence and the 
xiaoren’s end is profit, or gain. The overcoming of this duality of ends means the 
disappearance of junzi as a ruling class; hence, the moral term junzi disappears from Mozi’s 
philosophy. Of course, the word ‘junzi’ still retains its sociological significance. Since the 
problem of universal hunger is solved as the unintended consequence of man’s self-seeking, 
there is no need to educate him such that he strives for benevolence, rather than pure profit. 
This is the genuine justification for destroying the class of Confucius’ junzi. Mozi’s intent of 
teaching shang xian to the rulers, then, is not simply an act of benefaction, rather it is an act 
of actualizing his interpretation of justice: an aspect of his solution resolves the problem of 
universal hunger.  
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The goal of actualizing yi that Mozi has set for himself already implies a difference 
between Mozi himself and others: he needs to compel others to actualize yi while he himself 
needs no such compulsion. This distance is never bridged, even if Mozi succeeds in creating 
his world inhabited by his kind of xian, as opposed to Confucius’ kind, simply because only 
he acts in full awareness of all his actions while others believe themselves to be pursuing self-
gain, when in fact, they are indirectly performing deeds of yi. One may think that this 
distinction is superfluous, but it is not; it alludes to the original disagreement between Mozi 
and Confucius. Mozi’s novel concept of xian was aimed at collapsing the distinction between 
the junzi and xiaoren, the fundamental distinction of Confucius’ moral thought; it reveals man 
as he is – a being with only the single end of acquisition. Overcoming this duality between 
junzi and xiaoren has its price, that is, it leaves Mozi himself unaccounted for by the very 
system of shang xian he creates. Unconcerned with profit, his own end is distinct from those 
of his xian. Mozi himself returns to the distinction of Confucius in another form: he cannot 
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